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Many languages distinguish generic utterances (e.g., “Tigers are 
ferocious”) from non-generic utterances (e.g., “Those tigers are ferocious”).  
Generic sentences refer to kinds rather than to specific individuals.  Thus, 
generics pose a problem of induction even more striking than that of individual 
reference.  Three studies examined how generic language specially links 
properties and categories. 
In Study 1, I assessed comprehension of generics vis-à-vis the quantifier 
terms “all” and “some”. Generic utterances are distinct in that they are generally 
true, unlike indefinites (e.g., “Bats live in caves” is generic; “I saw some bats in 
the cave” is indefinite), but need not be true of all category members, unlike 
universal quantifiers (e.g. “all”).  Four-year-olds and adults appropriately 
distinguished “some” (e.g. “Do some girls have curly hair?”) from “all” (e.g., “Do 
all girls have curly hair?”), from generic (e.g., “Do girls have curly hair?”), 
although 3-year-olds did not. Three-year-olds did distinguish appropriately 
among category-property pairings of wide-scope (e.g., “Are fires hot?”), of 
narrow-scope (e.g. “Do books have color pictures?”), and of irrelevant-properties 
(e.g., “Do garages sing?”), but interpreted sentences with “all” and “some” just as 
they, and the older participants, treated generics.       
 In Study 2, I used a novel-word extension task to ask if 4- to 5-year-old
 
 x
 children and adults distinguish between generic and specific language, 
and judge that predicating a property of a depicted novel animal using generic 
language (e.g., “Bants have stripes”), rather than non-generic language (e.g., 
“This bant has stripes”) implies a more kind-relevant connection between 
category and property.  Participants were asked to endorse an extension of the 
label taught to a novel animal matching the target instance on either overall 
similarity or the mentioned property. Wording was found to have a significant 
effect on responses for both age groups. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 
2 in a more stringent test of the pull of generic language away from shape as a 
dimension along which to judge category membership.  Altogether, the results of 
these three studies suggest that the generic is a default interpretation for young 

















Many languages, including English, distinguish generic utterances 
(e.g., “Tigers are ferocious”) from non-generic utterances (e.g., “Those tigers are 
ferocious”).  The generic sentence differs importantly from the non-generic in  
that it refers to tigers as a kind  rather than to specific individuals.  How to 
capture, characterize, and contextualize this aspect of generic expressions has 
been of ongoing concern to linguists (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995) and philosophers 
(Leslie, 2005).  It is also of increasing interest to developmental psychologists 
studying children's knowledge about kinds (see Gelman, 2003; 2004; Prasada, 
2000).   
Indeed, although few researchers thus far have systematically referred to 
conceptual development in terms of the acquisition of 'generic knowledge' (for 
example, Prasada, 2000; Gelman, 2004), much recent investigation into 
children's early concepts  can be thought of as touching on what children know 
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about kinds as expressed via generics.  In many ways, generic language lies 
exactly at the crossroads between language and concept vis-á-vis the notion of 
'kind' itself.  But only recently have studies into the production, comprehension, 
and possible role of generic language in concept acquisition and structure been 
conducted.   
I aim in this dissertation to address a number of important questions about 
generic language by reporting three studies, all of which are intended to elucidate 
how generic expressions are understood by children, and by adults, to convey 
information about kinds.  In particular, I focus on how generic language reflects 
and influences children’s understanding of the link between kinds and predicated 
properties (e.g., between “cats” and “has claws”). 
In the introduction that follows I will outline key aspects of generic 
expressions in English, and their relationship to critical issues in cognitive 
development, providing the context and motivation for the studies included in the 
dissertation.  I will 1) delineate some of the special properties of generics that 
make them interesting to researchers studying language and concepts; 2) review 
evidence that generic language appears in the speech heard by young children 
and thus provides input about kinds; 3) review the evidence regarding what 
children know about generics; and 4) consider questions that remain concerning 
the links between generic language and kind concepts.  The three studies I will 
then report in turn are intended to examine how generic language is 
comprehended and, especially, how it affects reasoning about the links between 
categories and properties.   
 
 3
1.1 Special Qualities of Generics 
 Generic expressions have several special properties.  First, generics are 
interpreted as referring to kinds. The generic sentence “Bats live in caves” is 
taken to be about the kind ‘bat’ and not about an unspecified number of the 
creatures (as in the indefinite “There were bats in the caves”).  Because generics 
refer to kinds, it means that standard accounts of how meaning is fixed (by 
means of ostensive reference) cannot fully hold for generics, because kinds 
cannot be displayed directly or fully, in contrast to individuals.  For example, one 
can point to a dog and say “This is a dog”, but one cannot point to the class of 
dogs and say “This is the kind ‘dogs’”.  In this sense, generics pose a problem of 
induction even more striking than that discussed with regard to individual 
reference (e.g., Quine, 1960; Markman, 1989). 
Furthermore, generic expressions can be deemed true even in the face of 
exceptions; the fact that some bats live in zoos and some hang in bat-houses 
doesn’t seem to render the sentence false.  But generics do not only appear to 
convey that a property is relatively common among members of a category. For 
example, “Birds lay eggs” seems true even though there are many exceptions—
only mature females do so.  Even so, the generic “Birds are mature females” 
seems patently false.  Moreover, sentences such as “Sharks attack humans” can 
be taken as true even though exceedingly few individual sharks ever do, and 
actual episodes which could count as inspiration for such a generalization are 
similarly few and far between (see, for instance, Leslie, 2005).  Generic 
expressions appear to be resistant to revision at times as well, and do not seem 
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to require extensive experience for formulation.  Someone who proclaims that 
“Rock stars are egomaniacs” would probably still stand by their statement in the 
face of a selfless one, for example.    
Taken together, these intuitions about generics make for a linguistic and 
cognitive phenomenon which has proven resistant to wholly satisfying analysis, 
and which I will argue is also fertile ground for exploring the connections between 
language and concepts. Krifka et al. (1995) survey the linguist’s landscape for 
signs of a theory to convincingly cover the interesting phenomena of genericity.  
They point out that the ways in which generic sentences can be deemed true yet 
allow for exceptions is especially problematic for any ‘precise semantic 
framework’.  For example, any framework that assumes that generics function 
like quantifiers (such as “all” or “some”) will have difficulties with generics, 
because there is no stable amount or proportion that they refer to (sometimes 
referring to 99% of a category, sometimes referring to 50% of a category, 
sometimes referring to well under 10% of a category).  I will return to this point in 
the general discussion, but offer here the suggestion that a study of how generic 
language is acquired and comprehended might challenge existing linguistic 
accounts.   In particular, the evidence will suggest that generic expressions may 
be a default interpretation for children, rather than being built up out of concepts 
of individual instances.   
A further quality of generics is that there is no unique formal device for 
their expression, and no one-to-one mapping between generic form and generic 
meaning (Gelman, 2004).  Instead, there are multiple formal and contextual 
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considerations at play, jointly important and singly insufficient to determining the 
status of an utterance as kind-referring or not.  I have referred above, for 
instance, to how the same bare plural noun phrase (“bats”) can be used 
generically (as in “Bats live in caves”) or non-generically, to refer to an indefinite 
number of individuals (as in, for example, “Bats flew into the cave”). 
Although there are no one-to-one cues, identification of generics is quite 
systematic.  In particular, morphosyntactic, semantic, and contextual (pragmatic) 
sources of information are all relevant. The example above (“bats live” vs. “bats 
flew”) demonstrates one of the morphosyntactic cues to genericity; it is very 
difficult to achieve a generic reading of a sentence with a verb in the past tense.  
“A dog barks”, for instance, can be generic, whereas “A dog barked” can only be 
non-generic. Other morphosyntactic cues to genericity in English include number 
(plural vs. singular), determiners, and aspect (Gelman, 2004).  Determiner and 
number together cue generic readings: generic sentences may include NPs with 
a plural noun and no determiner (e.g. “Leopards are capable of acrobatic 
jumps”), a singular noun and the definite determiner (e.g., “The iguana is a cold-
blooded animal”), or a singular noun and the indefinite determiner (e.g., “A koala 
eats only eucalyptus leaves”).  The combination of a plural noun and the definite 
determiner (e.g., “The leopards are capable of acrobatic jumps”) is usually read 
as referring to specific leopards, and rarely to leopards generally.   Furthermore, 
aspect is also relevant to the availability of a generic reading.  For example, it is 
difficult to interpret the progressive present –“A bird is laying eggs”—as generic, 
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whereas the simple present—“A bird lays eggs”—is readily interpreted as 
generic.   
Gelman (2004) provides compelling illustrations of how discourse-
contextual factors, such as the construction of the sentence as a whole or 
extrasentential information, may also push construal toward or away from a 
generic reading.  For examples, Gelman considers the contrast between pairs of 
sentences such as “Lions live in Africa” and “There are lions in Africa”.  The first 
sentence is more readily understood to stipulate something about the kind ‘lion’ 
as a whole, whereas the second sentence seems to be indefinite, referring to a 
subset of the kind.  The differences between the two sentences lie at the level of 
the sentence overall—there are no morphosyntactic cues per se in either the 
noun phrase or the verb to distinguish them.  Gelman also cites the resolution of 
anaphoric reference as illustrative of discourse-relevant determinants of 
genericity.  She points to the contrast between the utterances “This is a tapir.  
They like to eat grubs”, and “These are my tapirs.  They like to eat grubs.” 
(Gelman 2004, p.452).  In the first pair of sentences, ‘they’ is read generically, as 
referring to the class of tapirs, whereas in the second, ‘they’ is read non-
generically, as referring to a plurality of tapirs demonstrably present.  As Gelman 
points out, in each case the pronoun whose referent must be determined is a 
plural pronoun, but in the first, generic reading the plural referent is inferred, 
alluded to via the abstraction of reference to the kind as a whole.  
 Children learning generic language are faced not only with these subtle 
discourse-based distinctions but further semantic ones, ostensibly as subtle, in 
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mastering generic forms. For instance, Gelman (2004) gives examples of world-
knowledge cues relevant to reading utterances as generic, such as choice of 
verb (e.g., “I like spaghetti” as generic vs. “I want spaghetti” as non-generic), or 
complex, possibly ‘naive-theory’-based interactions between  subjects and 
predicates  (for examples., “A tiger is carnivorous” can seem generic while  “A 
tiger is sick” does not; “A pig is dirty” is interpretable as generic while “A pot is 
dirty” is perhaps not). 
Although real world knowledge and discourse-contextual cues are relevant 
to interpreting a sentence as generic or non-generic in all languages, the formal 
properties specific ones may exploit for such distinctions do, of course, vary 
(Dahl, 1995). All of the above considerations hold for English specifically, and 
this dissertation is meant to address only the puzzle presented to learners of 
English.  Other languages pose different but parallel problems of acquisition to 
their learners (as addressed, for instance, in Tardif & Gelman, 1998; Goldin-
Meadow, et al., 2005), and to the linguists attempting formal analysis of generic 
expressions within them (Chierchia, 1998; Krifka, 2004). Because the present 
work is not intended to directly address how to best account for genericity as a 
linguistic phenomenon, I merely remind the reader here that I am covering 
English alone.    
The brief review provided above illustrates the challenge children face in 
learning generics.  This dissertation will not directly examine which cues children 
make use of to distinguish generics from non-generics (but see Gelman & 
Raman, 2003, for evidence on this point).  Nonetheless, to the extent that 
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children meet this challenge successfully and learn generic expressions at an 
early age, this suggests that the distinction between generic and non-generic 
concepts is a fundamental one for humans.   
 
1.2.  Generics in Child-Directed Speech 
Although generic language presents an interesting theoretical puzzle to 
linguists and philosophers, until recently it has been little explored in 
spontaneous speech.  Knowing how generics appear in natural contexts is 
important for several reasons.  First, we need to know how often children hear 
generic expressions to better gauge its importance as a source of input about 
kinds.  Are generic statements a relative rarity in speech directed to children, or 
do they come up frequently?  Their relative frequency has implications both for 
our thinking about what children have available to process, and about what 
parents and caretakers implicitly believe about the cognitive capacities of their 
young conversational partners.  Second, as with any question in language 
development, the form of input can give us clues to the acquisition process.  We 
would want to know, for instance, whether child-directed speech includes a 
greatly restricted range of forms for expression of generic meanings, thereby 
simplifying the language-learner’s task.  Finally, analysis of the particular 
situations in which generics are heard by children may tell us something about 
the sort of content more likely to be encoded in generic speech, and help us in 
creating more ecologically sound experimental probes of generic language.  
In their 1998 monograph, Gelman and colleagues considered 
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maternal input about richly structured categories (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, 
Hartman, & Pappas, 1998). They aimed to move beyond studies of labeling 
routines and toward a more inclusive and complex snapshot of the information 
potentially available to young children about animal and artifact kinds. They 
observed mother-child dyads reading picture books together—videotaping and 
and analyzing the language and language-related behaviors of mothers reading 
to their 20-month-old children and 30 mothers with their 35-month-old children.  
Among the forms of language they considered were generic expressions, and 
until their investigation there had been no reports of their frequency or distribution 
of generic noun phrases in adults' or children's speech. 
Strikingly, almost all of the mothers used at least one generic in the 10-15 
minute session, and 42% used more than five.  Generics accounted for between 
2.5 and 4% of maternal utterances in the 3 sub-studies.  Although this may not 
seem to be a large proportion, it is useful to put the number in some context.  In 
one of the sub-studies (as reported in Gelman 2004), for example, the rate at 
which generics were used exceeded that for talk about object size and color (2-
3% of utterances), number (<1% of utterances), or shape and texture (each 
<0.5% of utterances).  Comparing generics to other topics typically touched on in 
child-directed adult speech, generics appeared about as often as the belief-
desire talk relevant to theory-of-mind (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995).  
Two subsequent studies by Gelman and colleagues (Gelman & Pappas, 
1998; Gelman & Tardif, 1998) also examined the speech heard by young 
children, and replicated the above findings.  In their task most closely resembling 
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the book-reading activity from Gelman et al.’s monograph, Gelman and Tardif 
found  that all of the 24 English-speaking mothers of 20-month-old children they 
observed used at least 1 generic in a 30-minute session, and that generics 
appeared in 3.6% of their utterances. Pappas and Gelman (1998) also conducted 
a picturebook-reading study, with children ranging from 1 year 11 months to 4 
years 9 months old.  Twenty-four of the 26 mothers in their study used at least 
one generic during the short session, and on average 11% of all maternal 
utterances were generic.   
A further interesting point from the input data is that even when speaking 
with young children (2 years of age), parents use a range of forms to express 
generics (Gelman, 2004).  For example, in their picture-book reading studies of 
mother-child pairs, Gelman et al. (1998) found that of the mothers who produced 
at least one generic, just 21 percent restricted themselves to a single 
morphological form for expressing it.  Instead, mothers used the bare plural (e.g., 
“Rabbits like carrots”), the plural pronoun (e.g. “They [bats] come out at 
nighttime”), and the indefinite singular (e.g., “A chipmunk’s a little smaller than a 
squirrel”). Furthermore, 45% of these mothers used both a plural and a singular 
generic in the same session.  Indeed, sometimes they used them in the same 
sentence (e.g., “Did you know that when a pig gets to be big, they’re called 
hogs?”)! Gelman (2004) notes that while in observational studies (e.g., Gelman 
et al., 1998; Gelman & Pappas, 1998) mothers never used the definite singular 
generic (e.g., “The lion is a predatory cat”), the same form  (e.g., “bats”) was 
often used both generically (e.g. “Bats live in caves”) and non-generically (e.g. 
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“There are bats in that cave”). Thus, a simpler form-to-function mapping is not 
provided in the input to ease the task of learning generics.  Adults speak to 
children as if children could readily interpret a variety of forms as referring to 
generic concepts. 
Contexts of Use.  The contexts in which parents produce generics are 
different from the contexts in which non-generics are produced.  Importantly, 
these differences have implications for the sorts of meanings expressed in 
parental generics.  In particular, generics are used to refer to relatively richly 
structured categories, and to refer to concepts abstracted away from the 
immediate context. 
Generics appear particularly frequently in talk about animals; controlling 
for many possible confounding factors, generic expressions were significantly 
more likely to occur in talk about animals than about artifacts (Gelman et al., 
1998; Gelman et al., in press; Gelman & Tardif, 1998; Goldin-Meadow et al., 
2005).  Given that animal kinds are more stable and essentialized than artifact 
kinds (Gelman, 2003), this implies that parental generics may be particularly 
suited for expressing properties of stable, inductively rich categories. 
Generic utterances are also more likely to occur during reading activities 
and while looking at pictures of objects, than during free play with toys (Gelman 
& Tardif, 1998; Gelman, Chesnick, & Waxman, 2005). Although the significance 
of this pattern is debatable, it suggests that generics may be associated less with 
immediate experience (e.g., objects and animals that function and behave in the 
 
 12
real world), and more with abstractions less closely tied to immediate 
experiences (e.g., pictures, that abstract away from real-world objects).   
 Altogether, although the evidence is indirect, contextual differences in 
expression of generics implies that parental generics are particularly suited to 
richly structured categories that are abstracted away from concrete experiences. 
Generics versus Other Kind-Referring Expressions.  All of these findings 
suggest that speech containing generics is reliably present as input to children, 
and that the frequency of generics is correlated with interesting differences 
related to the ease with which a speaker might move conversation away from the 
current context and toward an abstraction.   Moreover, the frequency with which 
generics appear in the input stands in contrast to the relative dearth of other and 
more explicit reference to kinds.  Utterances about members of categories in 
terms of set-theoretic notions—for instance, those including the universal 
quantifier ‘all’—are comparably scarcer.  Gelman et al. (1998) found that less 
than 2% of the total maternal uses of “all” expressed a universal quantifier, 
accounting for less than 0.03% of total maternal utterances.  It was far more 
common for ‘all’ to refer to specific referents.    
Furthermore, Gelman, Hollander, Star, and Heyman (2000) analyzed the 
spontaneous conversations recorded in the CHILDES database (MacWhinney & 
Snow, 1985, 1990).  They examined the speech directed to eight English-
speaking children between 2 and 5 years old recorded in CHILDES to determine 
the nature and frequency of appearance for the words “kind”, and a fuller list of 
universal quantifiers: “all”, “every”, “each”, and “any”.  The word ‘kind’ was 
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searched for exhaustively in the transcripts for “Adam” (Brown, 1973), and of  
more than 20,000 parental utterances culled from 55 taping sessions, only 10 
included “kind” in reference to a basic-level generic kind.  A further 27 referred to 
a subordinate-level generic kind (e.g., distinguishing among kinds of balloons, for 
instance, in “Yours looks like a dirigible, the kind of balloon people used to fly 
inside of”), and the rest of the 204 total target uses of ‘kind’ (i.e., those other than 
its homonym form meaning ‘nice’) were specific references, most often in 
requesting a label or further information about an individual instance of a 
category, as in for example “What kind of gun is that?”. 
All occurrences of the words ‘all’, ‘each’, ‘every’, and ‘any’ in adult speech 
directed toward Adam were also examined and, similarly, it was found to be 
exceedingly rare for these quantifier terms to be used about kinds.  The term ‘all’ 
was notably more frequent in these samples of spontaneous speech than in the 
picturebook-reading studies (Gelman et al., 1998; Gelman & Pappas, 1998; 
Gelman & Tardif 1998), and accounted for the majority of target utterances; but 
altogether there were just 38 instances of kind-referring universal quantifiers, less 
than 0.4% of maternal utterances.   
Gelman and colleagues suggest that the evidence be taken to indicate the 
unlikelihood that universal quantifiers, or explicit reference to ‘kinds’ of things, 
convey much to children about the properties shared by members of categories 
(Gelman et al., 2000).  They offer three criteria that should be met when deciding 
whether a linguistic form might be considered to play a role in cognitive 
development:  that it be reliably present in the input, that its use by caretakers 
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correspond to relevant conceptual distinctions (for instance, the differences 
between animate and artifact kinds in the complexity of the knowledge structures 
with which they are associated; see, for example, Gelman, 2003 for a summary), 
and that it be comprehended by children.  Generic language seems to meet the 
first two, but they note that little research had at that point been done on how 
children understand the form. 
 
1.3 What Children Know about Generics 
Children’s Generic Production.  Despite the multiple and complex cues for 
expressing generics in English, there is growing evidence that even very young 
children use them appropriately in context.  Pappas and Gelman (1998) found 
that 1% of their 2-year-old, and 5% of their 3- and 4-year-old participants’ 
utterances were generic. Furthermore, in their sample of 35 mother-child dyads 
engaged with toys and pictures in two sub-studies, Gelman, Chesnick, and 
Waxman (2005) found that 3.6% of the 2 and 3-year-old children’s on-task 
utterances were generic.  While the consistent appearance of generic speech is 
notable, these observational experiments were designed to elicit generic 
language, and thus leave open questions about whether fully spontaneous 
conversations would show similar frequencies and developmental trends.  A 
study done by Goldin-Meadow, Mylander, and Gelman (2005) included analyses 
of  8 children between 3 and 4 years old, taped in their homes playing with toys, 
books, and pictures brought by researchers but which were not intended to elicit 
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generics. They found that 1.6% of these children’s utterances contained generic 
expressions.   
Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, and Flukes (in press) have conducted the most 
thorough analysis of generics in spontaneous speech to date, surveying the 
CHILDES database (MacWhinney & Snow,1990) of extensive, longitudinal, 
natural language samples from 8 children.  The percentage of children’s 
utterances they coded as generic increased from under 1% at 2 years of age, to 
over 2% at age 3, and over 3% at age 4.  Caretaker speech in these naturalistic 
samples were also in keeping with those from the observational studies—ranging 
from 1.5% when the target children were 2 years old, to over 3% when they were 
3 and 4 years old.  Furthermore, they found that every child produced generics in 
all three—plural, singular, and mass—of the forms they tracked.  The 
researchers also analyzed utterances containing generics in terms of their 
conversational context, and found that although exchanges which included a 
generic expression were more likely to be initiated by the parent at age 2 or 3, at 
age 4 children were as likely as adults to serve as the source of an initial generic 
reference.  Moreover, for sequences in which children used at least one generic 
themselves, at all ages examined they were more likely than their adult 
conversational partners to have initiated the exchange. 
Children’s Generic Comprehension.  To date there has been little research 
on how generics are understood.  Gelman and Raman (2003) provide one of the 
first systematic investigations into how children make use of formal and 
pragmatic cues to distinguish between generic and non-generic utterances.  
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They point out that although the patterns of language use detailed above suggest 
that children make appropriate semantic distinctions between generic and non-
generic speech, the question of how they do so remains. Gelman and Raman 
found that by 4 years of age children were able to use multiple cues (both formal 
and pragmatic) to identify an utterances as generic, and that even children as 
young as 2 ½ years go beyond their real-world knowledge about the categories 
in question, interpreting queries as generic or non-generic based on both 
linguistic form cues and contextual information.     
That children are demonstrably able to use linguistic cues to distinguish 
between specific and generic reference is important to the total background I aim 
to convey.  There is obviously some development at work, indicated by the 
increase from age 2 to age 4 in both the use of multiple cues to genericity, and 
the frequency of generic production.  But even at young preschool age, children 
are capable of processing generic language remarkably well.  This ability leads 
me to ask how generic language might serve a role in the acquisition of 
knowledge about the kinds to which generic expressions refer.  I turn to this 
question below 
 
1.4  Some Questions Regarding Generic Language and Generic Knowledge 
 Much of what we know about the world can be thought of in terms of the 
generalities captured in generic sentences.  This is an intuition expressed by 
theorists in the diverse realms of linguistics, philosophy, cognitive science, and 
developmental psychology.  
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 Krifka et al. (1995, p. 3) state that “...much of our knowledge of the world, 
and many of our beliefs about the world, are couched in terms of characterizing 
sentences.  Such sentences, we take it, are either true or false—they are not 
‘indeterminate’, or ‘figurative’, or ‘metaphorical’, or ‘sloppy talk’. After all, we 
certainly would want to count the classic Snow is white as literally having a truth 
value!”  Krifka and his colleagues are linguists wrestling with the question of how 
to encompass truth-value judgments in a coherent treatment of generics, but 
such considerations can be found in other literatures.  Researchers in artificial 
intelligence, for example, grapple with the representation of “common sense 
knowledge” wherein generically stated facts can be ‘logically’ true and yet admit 
of exceptions (for example, see McCarthy, 1986).  Similarly, Prasada (2000) 
outlines a formalism for representing what he terms “generic knowledge” that he 
argues not only captures the interesting truth-value properties of generic 
language but also resolves some important questions about concept 
acquisition—especially, how do children come to have knowledge about kinds of 
things? 
It is this question which Gelman (2004) dubs “the puzzle of generic 
knowledge” itself.  How, she asks, do we come to have beliefs about a kind as a 
whole based on experience with small numbers of instances?  This really is the 
central question of abstracting away from specific experience and toward 
generalizations about new instances—in other words, the issue of concept 
formation (Medin & Rips, 2005).  Prasada (2000) posits that we come to have 
beliefs of the sort expressed in true generic sentences primarily via a formal 
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system that allows experience of even a single instance to be sufficient to 
acquire a new generic ‘fact’.   He suggests that early on in the acquisition of 
generic knowledge children might be especially likely to rely on the mechanisms 
he describes, instead of the statistical processes implicit in creating a ‘type’ from 
the properties held in common by individual tokens (Prasada 2000, p. 70).  As he 
claims, this turns on its head the typical suppositions about how concepts are 
acquired. 
Short of evaluating the tenability of Prasada’s cognitive model, but taking 
seriously the potential fruitfulness of his approach to explaining how children and 
adults come to have generic knowledge, the importance of generic language to 
the enterprise becomes clear.  In an interesting variation on the more typical 
linguist’s endeavor, Prasada’s model can be seen as accounting for some of the 
troublesome properties of generic expressions with a formalism designed to 
explain the acquisition of what he terms common-sense knowledge. On his 
analysis, generic knowledge is fundamentally different from knowledge of 
statistical regularities, and the distinction is critically captured in generic 
expressions.  The sentence “Dogs are four-legged”, then, can be glossed as 
“Dogs, by virtue of the kind of thing they are, are four-legged” (Prasada 2000, p. 
66).  This stands in contrast to sentences with explicit quantifiers, for example 
“All dogs are four-legged”, and “X% of dogs are four-legged”, which are claims 
about statistical prevalence and cannot be glossed as generics can.  Indeed, on 
his analysis, such statements are inherently subject to qualification as in “X% of 
dogs surveyed so far in this area are four-legged” (p. 67).  In Prasada’s model, 
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then, generic expressions explain how essential properties become associated 
with kinds of things.  Furthermore, in contrast to traditional views on concept 
acquisition (e.g., exemplar-based, prototype, or even classical-definition 
accounts), concepts are not built up out of individual tokens, and there is 
therefore not the presumed inductive leap to acquire generalized beliefs.  
Gelman (2004) similarly notes that concepts about abstract kinds are not 
supplied directly by personal observations of the world, because members of a 
kind cannot be fully enumerated.  Therefore generic language, she argues, likely 
serves at the very least as a means for conveying information broadly applicable 
to members of the category, or as Medin and Rips (2005) have suggested, for 
predicating ‘typical’ properties.  Gelman (2004) also addresses the ways in which 
language generally might be tied to generic knowledge and contends that 
abstract kinds might be impossible without language; language is critically 
needed to stipulate properties true of a kind and not some sample of individuals, 
and required also for the important act of naming, whereby individuals are 
deemed members of a category and therefore likely to share important 
similarities with other members (Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & Markman, 
1986).  Waxman and Markow (1995) have suggested that naming serves as an 
invitation to form a category. By hearing the novel label “tapir” in reference to a 
novel animal, the child forms an assumption that there is a category of similar 
things, also called tapirs.  Analogously, I propose that generic noun phrases 
may serve as an invitation to link a property to a category.   By hearing the 
generic statement “Tapirs have white-tipped ears” in reference to a novel animal, 
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the child forms an assumption that the feature of white-tipped ears is relatively 
important to the identity of tapirs as a category.  Thus, children may assume that 
new instances of the category “tapir” will also have this property.1  
 How properties and categories become connected is a central question in 
the study of concepts and kinds. How do children come to understand, for 
instance, that being striped is an idiosyncratic property of cats or shirts, but a 
central property of tigers?  The centrality of stripes to tigers is, of course, 
important to distinguishing a tiger from a leopard, whether for the purposes of 
deciding on a course of action or for communicating with a conversational partner 
about them.  In short, children must learn to distinguish specific reference and 
idiosyncratic properties from generic expression and kind-relevant properties, 
and how they do so has interesting ramifications for ideas about language and 
concept. 
 One means of determining which properties are more versus less central 
is by direct observation of the surrounding environment.  However, in many 
(perhaps most) cases, the evidence would be too ambiguous to permit powerful 
                                                 
1  It seems appropriate to here address a non-trivial issue regarding terminology.  I have been 
using the terms “kind”, “category”, and even occasionally “concept”, somewhat interchangeably. 
This, I believe, reflects their relatedness for the present purposes but does not preclude the 
potential relevance of the distinctions, even for the issues at hand; they are simply considerations 
beyond the scope of the current study.  The notion of ‘concept’ is, despite its central place in so 
many theories about cognition, subject to much vague use and I continue in that vein by taking it 
to mean, roughly, a mental representation (of categories or of individuals).  In this sense it is the 
most inclusive of the three terms.  ‘Category’ refers to a set of two or more discriminably different 
things with a common attribute.  Thus, a category can be “dogs,” or “green things,” or “things to 
take out of a burning building,” or ”things I can place on my counters to keep the cat off.” As 
Gelman (2003) points out, categories can range from arbitrary, laboratory-created groupings, to 
the type of goal-derived category (Barsalou, 1985) represented in sentences like “things to take to 
school”, to ‘natural kind’ categories, that entail “...dense clusters of highly correlated features, and 
display rich inductive potential...”(Gelman 2003, p. 12), such as “kangaroo” or “gold”.  I use the 
term “kind” to refer not only to natural kinds per se, but to any category with relatively rich 
inductive potential, including pigs, pencils, flags, Republicans…  For the most part, kind concepts 
are referred to with common nouns. 
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inferences.  For example, I might have seen only one actual tiger in my life, and 
therefore cannot be certain whether stripedness generalizes to other instances.  
Or, the evidence might favor a generalization, but I cannot be certain that my 
sample is representative.  For example, perhaps all the cats I have encountered 
have been striped, but my sample is rather small.  Does this mean that cats in 
general are striped?   
 It should be no surprise that I am suggesting that language is a powerful 
tool for conveying the scope of a property with respect to a category.  Indeed, it is 
unclear how such generalizations could be expressed in the absence of 
language (Gelman, 2003).  With language, we can elegantly convey that a 
property holds generally true of a kind, without having to enumerate many 
instances.  This can be done by means of quantification (e.g., “All tigers are 
striped”; “Most tigers are striped”), but as discussed earlier, category-wide 
generalizations are most typically conveyed by means of generic statement.   
 Although it is clear that generics express such property-category links for 
adults, what had not been studied previously was whether children are sensitive 
to this expressive power of generics.  Do children treat properties expressed with 
generics to imply that a property is more tightly bound to a category?  If so, does 
this influence not only their interpretation of generics for familiar categories and 
properties, but also their interpretation of novel categories and properties?  That 
generic expressions evoke reference to kinds in their entirety makes it a 
language form particularly felicitous for specification of properties relevant to 
identifying new instances, an important function of concepts as a construct 
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(Medin & Rips, 2004).  To the extent that children are sensitive to this implication, 
it would demonstrate an important means that language has for affecting 
children’s knowledge representations. 
Thus, I suggest that hearing generic language—like hearing a category 
name— may influence how powerfully children link a property to a category.  This 
idea has been proposed but not tested by others.  Prasada (2000) suggests that 
generic language associates properties with categories, by glossing generics as 
expressing that a property holds “by virtue of the kind of thing [the category] is”; 
similarly, Shipley (1993) interprets generics about animals as expressing that 
members of the category “are the kind of animal such that” the property holds.  
Thus, generic language may both reflect and influence important conceptual 
distinctions relevant to individual kind concepts, (e.g., concepts  of “cat”, “shark”, 
“girl” ) and to larger knowledge representations (e.g., theories related to pets, 
predators, and people).   
In this dissertation I report three studies, all of which specifically examine 
how generic expressions influence relationships between property and category.  
As detailed above, generics are special in what they imply about the property-
category relationship—they seem to link a predicated property to the kind 
referred to in a ‘central’, law-like way (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2005; 
Lyons 1977), in a manner related to the acquisition and representation of generic 
knowledge (Gelman, 2004; Prasada, 2000; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006).  I hope 
to have established above that genericity is an intriguing phenomenon, 
representing a crucial mode of referring to kinds of things, of talking abstractly, of 
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moving beyond the “here and now”.  Mothers seem to use generic language with 
their children from an early age, children themselves seem to speak of things 
generically, and there is evidence suggesting that they are used differentially to 
refer to more richly-structured categories and in contexts more conducive to 
speaking abstractly.  These findings, coupled with a general lack of other, more 
explicit references to kinds and categories (Gelman et al., 1998; Gelman et al., 
2000; Gelman, 2004) compels us to look closely at genericity  as it lies at the 
heart of important inductive challenges to the child, in both the realms of 
language acquisition and conceptual development.     
The Present Studies 
The present studies examine whether the link between property and 
category differs when it is expressed with generic language as compared to 
when it is expressed with non-generic language.  In the first of the three studies, I 
assess how both children and adults understand generics vis-á-vis the relevant 
quantifier terms “all” and “some”.   Each of these expressions (generic, “all”, and 
“some”) represents a distinctive relationship between category and predicated 
property.  By asking when in development children begin to distinguish these 
forms from one another, we can discover important information about how 
generics are interpreted as generally true (unlike “some”) but not necessarily true 
(unlike “all”).  The second and third studies use a word-learning paradigm to 
examine whether generic language establishes special links between properties 
and categories.    
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I use a multiple manuscripts format, and so each study is reported with a 
brief introduction and discussion.  Study 1 has been published in Developmental 












Study 1: Children’s Interpretation of Generic Noun Phrases 
 
In Study 1, we focused directly on what generics mean to young children 
by using a comprehension task. As noted in Chapter One, for adults, generics 
are distinctive in implying broad category scope (e.g., “Birds fly” is generally true 
of birds) yet allowing for exceptions (e.g., penguins). Thus, generics are distinct 
from both “all” (e.g., “All birds fly”) and “some” (e.g., “Some birds fly”). We 
conducted an experiment to test whether preschool children appreciate this.  
The study was modeled after an experiment conducted by Smith (1980) 
that focused on children’s interpretation of “all” and “some.” In Smith’s (1980) 
study, children ages 4 years 1 month to 7 years 6 months received a series of 
questions regarding properties of categories. One third of the properties were 
true of all members of the category in question (what we call wide-scope 
properties), one third were true of some members of the category (narrow-scope 
properties), and one third were true of no members of the category (irrelevant 
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properties). Children were asked about each category–property pairing with 
either the word all or the word some (e.g., “Do all people have blonde hair?” vs. 
“Do some people have blonde hair?”). Smith’s (1980) results indicated that even 
4-year-olds appropriately distinguished “all” and “some” under favorable 
presentation conditions (i.e., the first half of the first block of questions). 
We predicted that if adults were given the same task with questions 
presented in generic form, they would treat generics as partly like “all” and partly 
like “some.” In particular, we predicted that adults would accept both wide-scope 
properties and (to a lesser extent) narrow-scope properties as true in generic 
form.  These predictions follow rather straightforwardly from the semantic 
analyses provided earlier. Nonetheless, they would constitute novel empirical 
demonstrations given the lack of evidence regarding what generics mean to lay 
adults (for an exception, see Gelman & Tardif, 1998, Study 3). Of primary interest 
was children’s understanding, relative to these predictions with adults. 
Method 
Participants. Three-year-old children (N = 18; age range = 3 years 0 
months to 3 years 11 months; mean age = 3 years 6 months), 4-year-old children 
(N = 18; age range = 4 years 0 months to 4 years 10 months; mean age = 4 
years 5 months), and adults (N = 38) participated. The adults were 
undergraduates at a large, midwestern university enrolled in a course in 
developmental psychology; the children attended local preschools in the same 
town as the university. 
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Items.   Participants each received three blocks of questions (generic, 
“all,” and “some”), in one of three orders (all–some–generic, some– generic–all, 
or generic–all–some).  For 4-year-olds and adults, each block consisted of 12 
questions: 4 concerning wide-scope properties (e.g., “Are fires hot?”), 4 
concerning narrow-scope properties (e.g., “Do girls have curly hair?”), and 4 
concerning irrelevant properties (e.g., “Do fish have branches?”). Many of the 
questions were derived from Smith (1980). 
Three-year-olds received half as many items as the 4-year-olds and 
adults. Appendix A shows the full list of items, and indicates which were used 
with 3-year-olds.  Each property was rotated through each of the three wording 
conditions so that the specific content was not confounded with a particular 
condition (e.g., across children, a given question would be “Are fires hot?” “Are 
all fires hot?” or “Are some fires hot?”). 
We had three reasons for presenting the items in blocks rather than 
intermixing the three kinds of wording over the course of the experiment. First, 
one benefit of blocking trials is that it minimizes carryover effects. If a question of 
Type A sets a particular context and a question of Type B sets a different 
context, then there is concern that a child may have difficulty switching from one 
context to another context repeatedly throughout the course of an experimental 
session (see Zelazo & Frye, 1998, for evidence that 3-year-old children have 
difficulty switching flexibly between rules). By blocking the items, the amount of 
switching is minimized and a more sensitive test is thus provided. Second, we 
wished to break up the task to maintain children’s interest. The current design 
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required many trials per participant (as noted above, 36 at age 4 and 18 at age 
3). By chunking the task into three parts, we were able to maintain children’s 
interest throughout the task. Third, Smith (1980), whose studies formed the basis 
of this study, also presented questions in blocks (“all” questions appeared in one 
block; “some” questions appeared in another, with order of blocks 
counterbalanced). In building on this work, we attempted to keep aspects of the 
design comparable. 
Procedure 
 Children were tested individually in a quiet room at their schools. Before 
the testing session, each child was told that he or she would be playing a special 
game. Most of the 3-year-olds (14 of 18) then received a warm-up task to 
introduce them generally to answering questions posed by the experimenter. The 
warm-up consisted of four simple yes/no questions (e.g., “Is this a spoon?” when 
showing a picture of a spoon; “Is this a chair?” when showing a picture of a pig); 
two of the correct answers were “yes” and two of the correct answers were “no.” 
Children performed extremely well on the warm-up task. Children were then 
introduced to the main task. The experimenter said, “We are going to play a 
game with this special board [an 8 X 10 in. photo frame covered in Velcro] and 
these special cards [colored, laminated 3 X 5 in. index cards with Velcro on the 
back] that you can stick right on the board. Each card has a question on it, and 
you get to pick a card and stick it right on the board, and then we can talk about 
what it says on the card. OK?” The cards were color-coded by trial block—yellow 
for generic, green for “all,” and purple for “some.” Cards for each block were kept 
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in separate envelopes. The experimenter emptied an envelope of cards for a 
given block, laid them out face down before the child, and told the child that he or 
she could pick one card at a time and put it up on the board. For each trial, the 
child picked a card and placed it in the photo frame.  Three of the 4-year-old 
children received the task without the Velcro frame, but all other aspects of the 
procedure were the same as with the other child participants. The experimenter 
read the question aloud and both audio-taped and wrote down the child’s 
response. 
Three-year-olds were also given a posttest task designed to test their 
comprehension of “all” and “some” with concrete and immediately perceptible 
referents (modeled on a pretest developed by Smith, 1979, p. 439). Children 
were told, “Now we have a new game to play for a little while. Look, I have a box 
and crayons.” The experimenter produced a small clear container and a plastic 
bag containing four crayons. There were eight trials, four with “all” and four with 
“some.” For each trial, the experimenter placed zero, two, three, or four of the 
crayons into the box and then asked, “Are all of the crayons in the box?” (on “all” 
trials) or “Are some of the crayons in the box?” (on “some” trials). The questions 
were presented in two blocks, an “all” block and a “some” block, with order of the 
blocks counterbalanced across participants. The order of the questions within a 
block (zero, two, three, or four crayons in the box) was randomized separately for 
each participant, with the constraint that the potentially ambiguous questions 
were presented last (zero for “all” and four for “some” were always presented last 
in the block). Smith (1979) had found that children as young as 4 years of age 
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had no difficulty with this task, and so we included only 3-year-olds on the 
posttest. Adults were tested in a group with a paper-and-pencil version of the 
task. They were told that they would be participating in an experiment that was 
designed for young children. They received a booklet with one question on each 
page. They were asked to write down their answer to each question in the space 
provided below the question itself. 
Results 
Responses were scored as follows: 1 for each “yes” response, 0 for each 
response of “no” or “none,” and 0.5 for each response that didn’t fit into either 
category (when respondents did not give a yes or no answer; e.g., when asked 
“Do girls have curly hair?” a child might reply “some do” without responding “yes” 
or “no”). Such cases were relatively rare, accounting for only 4.6% of the 
responses of 3-year-olds, 6.6% of the responses of 4-year-olds, and 1.3% of the 
responses of adults. The primary reason for coding these responses as 0.5 is 
that they indicate a reluctance to commit to a definitive “yes” or “no” answer. A 
0.5 coding reflects this, as it indicates an answer that is intermediate between 
“yes” and “no.” A further motivation is that this coding scheme is unbiased, 
weighted toward neither response.  Approximately three fourths of these 
intermediate responses occurred in three of the nine cells of the study design: 
“all” questions regarding narrow-scope properties (e.g., “Do all clothes have 
zippers?”), generic questions regarding narrow-scope properties (e.g., “Does milk 
have chocolate in it?”), and “some” questions regarding wide-scope properties 
(e.g., “Are some fires hot?”), accounting for 22%, 30%, and 24% of the 
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intermediate responses, respectively. These cells can be considered anomalous 
in that they pair either a noun phrase typically broad in scope with a narrow-
scope property or a noun phrase typically narrow in scope with a broad-scope 
property. The rest of the indeterminate answers were scattered fairly equally 
across the other six cells of the study design, each cell accounting for 0% to 6% 
of these responses. 
For each participant, we summed the scores, separately for each of the 
nine cells in the study design (three forms of the question [all–generic–some] x 
three types of properties [wide scope, narrow scope, irrelevant]). Thus, each 
participant received nine scores, each of which could range from 0 to 4 (for 4-
year-olds and adults) or from 0 to 2 (for 3-year-olds). The scores of the 3-
yearolds were then transformed by multiplying each score by two, thereby 
rendering them on the same scale as the two older age groups. 
These scores were then entered into a 3 (age: 3 years, 4 years, or adult) 
X 3 (wording: all, generic, or some) X 3 (property: wide scope, narrow scope, or 
irrelevant) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The results can be seen in Figure 2.1 
.As expected, there was a significant main effect of property, F(2, 142) =845.14, 
p < .0001. Not surprisingly, participants endorsed wide-scope properties most 
often (M =10.63 out of 12), narrow-scope properties less often (M = 6.81 out of 
12), and irrelevant properties least often (M = 0.53 out of 12). 
All the remaining effects involved wording. First, there was a significant 
effect of wording, F(2, 142) = 46.80, p < .0001, with each of the three forms of 
wording significantly different from one another: “Some” questions yielded the 
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highest affirmations (M = 7.23 out of 12), followed by generic questions (M = 
6.34), followed by “all” (M = 4.40). To put this another way, participants were 
most selective as to which properties they would attribute to “all” category 
members and least selective as to which properties they would attribute to 
“some” category members, with generic statements intermediate. The wording 
effect interacted with age, F(4, 142) = 10.48, p < .001. However, this two-way 
interaction must be interpreted in light of the significant three-way interaction 
involving wording, property, and age, F(8, 284) =12.20, p < .001.  
To explore this three-way interaction in detail, we conducted separate 
Wording X Property ANOVAs within each age group separately. Doing so 
revealed a striking developmental change from 3 to 4 years of age. At age 3, 
children did display a significant effect of property, F(2, 34) = 113.84, p < .0001. 
However, wording exerted no significant effects. In contrast, for 4-year-olds, 
there were significant effects of wording, F(2, 34) = 9.66, p < .001; property, 
F(2,34) = 217.94, p < .001; and Wording X Property, F(4, 68) = 20.53, p < .001. 
With the wide-scope properties, 4-year-olds were more likely to answer “yes” in 
response to “all” questions, than in response to “some” questions (p < .05). There 
was no significant difference between generic and either “all” or “some” on these 
items. In contrast, with narrow-scope properties, 4-year-olds were more likely to 
answer “yes” in response to “some” and generic questions than in response to 
“all” questions (p < .01). There was no significant difference between “some” and 
generic on these items. Finally, for both generic and “all” questions considered 
separately, 4-year-olds were more likely to affirm wide-scope properties than 
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narrow-scope properties (p < .05). In contrast, there was no significant difference 
between wide-scope and narrow-scope properties for “some” questions. 
Adults showed patterns very similar to those of 4-year-olds. There were 
significant effects of wording, F(2, 74) = 177.61, p < .0001; property (2,74) = 
942.35, p < .0001; and Wording X Property, F(4, 148) = 119.41, p <.0001. With 
the wide-scope properties, adults were more likely to answer “yes” in response to 
generic questions than in response to “all” questions (p < .01). There was no 
significant difference between “some” and generic or between “all” and “some” on 
these items. In contrast, with narrow-scope properties, adults were more likely to 
answer “yes” in response to “some” and generic questions than in response to 
“all” questions (p < .001) and were more likely to answer “yes” in response to 
“some” questions than in response to generic questions (p < .001). Finally, for 
both generic and “all” questions considered separately, adults were more likely to 
affirm wide-scope properties than narrow-scope properties (p < .001). In contrast, 
for “some” questions, adults showed the opposite pattern: They were more likely 
to affirm narrow-scope than wide-scope properties (p < .05). When we compared 
the age groups with one another, using Tukey’s honestly significant difference 
test, we found that all of the age differences were localized in two types of 
questions: narrow-scope properties in the “all” condition (with 3-year-olds’ 
responses higher than 4-year-olds’, p <.001, which were higher than adults’, p < 
.005), and narrow-scope properties in the “some” condition (with adults’ 
responses higher than those of either 3-year-olds or 4-year-olds, p < .005, which 
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did not differ from one another). There were no significant age effects in the 
generic wording condition. 
Order effects. Because the order of wording was blocked (i.e., all generic 
questions in one block, all “all” questions in another block, all “some” questions in 
another block, with blocks quasi-counterbalanced), this raises the possibility that 
children may have developed response sets within each block that led to 
artificially distinguishing the three kinds of wording. Note that the task could not 
have created a distinction where none exists. That is, if children and adults come 
into the study with no a priori differentiation between generic, “all,” and “some,” 
then hearing such items blocked and contrasted would not impose a novel 
semantic interpretation on the spot. In particular, it is implausible that participants 
would reach a consistent interpretative distinction between the three forms simply 
on the basis of noticing that the blocks differed. Nonetheless, the blocking of 
trials may have influenced response patterns, and it is important to examine 
whether the results hold up when possible carryover effects are eliminated. 
To examine this issue, we conducted a secondary analysis that reran the study 
as a between-subjects design, by including only the data from the first block of 
trials. Figure 2.2 presents the results of this analysis. Keep in mind that this is a 
highly stringent test, as for the 3- and 4-year-olds there were only 6 participants 
per wording condition on this analysis. Specifically, we conducted a 3 (age: 3-
year-olds, 4-year-olds, or adults) X 3 (wording condition: all, generic, or some) X 
3 property scope (wide scope, narrow scope, or irrelevant) ANOVA, with age and 
wording condition as between-subjects variables and property scope as a 
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repeated-measures variable. From this analysis, we again obtained the expected 
main effect of property, F(2, 130) = 329.91, p < .001, and a Property X Age 
interaction, F(4, 130) = 2.69, p < .05. All remaining effects involved wording. 
There was a main effect of wording, F(2, 65) = 11.79, p < .001; a Wording X Age 
interaction, F(4, 65) = 3.37, p < .02; and a three-way interaction involving 
wording, age, and property type, F(8, 130) = 4.78, p <.001. To explore this three-
way interaction in detail, we conducted separate Wording X Property ANOVAs 
within each age group separately. As in the overall ANOVA reported earlier, 3-
year-old children displayed a significant effect of property, F(2, 30) = 56.00, p < 
.001, but no significant effects involving wording. In contrast, for 4-year-olds, 
there were significant effects of wording, F(2, 15) = 3.47, p = .06; property, F(2, 
30) = 65.58, p < .001; and Wording X Property, F(4, 30) = 7.81, p < .001. With 
the narrow-scope properties, 4-year-olds were most likely to answer “yes” in 
response to “some” questions, least likely to answer “yes” in response to “all” 
questions, and responses to generic questions were intermediate (p < .05). 
Finally, for both generic and “all” questions considered separately, 4-year-olds 
were more likely to affirm wide-scope properties than narrow-scope properties (p 
< .05). In contrast, there was no significant difference between wide-scope and 
narrow-scope properties for “some” questions. 
Adults showed patterns very similar to those of 4-year-olds. There were 
significant effects of wording, F(2, 35) = 80.95, p <.001; property, F(2,70) = 
340.01, p <.001; and Wording X Property, F(4, 70) = 46.74, p < .001. With 
narrow-scope properties, adults were more likely to answer “yes” in response to 
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“some” and generic questions than in response to “all” questions (p < .001) and 
were more likely to answer “yes” in response to “some” questions than in 
response to generic questions (p < .001).Finally, for both generic and “all” 
questions considered separately, adults were more likely to affirm wide-scope 
properties than narrow-scope properties (p < .02). In contrast, for “some” 
questions, there was no significant difference between wide-scope and narrow-
scope properties. 
Thus, the results of this reanalysis largely replicate those of the overall 
study, with 3-year-olds demonstrating only a main effect of property type and no 
effects of wording but 4-year-olds and adults each showing a main effect of 
property type, a main effect of wording, and a Property Type X Wording 
interaction. Furthermore, just as in the overall analysis, this analysis 
demonstrated that 4-year-olds and adults (but not 3-year-olds) treat generics as 
partly like “all” and partly like “some.” On the narrow-scope properties, 4-year-
olds and adults say “yes” to generic questions significantly more often than to 
“all” questions but significantly less often than to “some” questions. In other 
words, responses to questions like “Do girls have curly hair?” are intermediate 
between “Do all girls have curly hair?” and “Do some girls have curly hair?” 
Altogether, these subsidiary analyses render it implausible that blocking 
introduced artificial response sets. 
Qualifying responses. We then examined how often participants qualified 
their response with “some” (e.g., in response to “Do girls have curly hair?” a child 
might say “Some girls do” or “Yes, some girls do”) or with “all” (e.g., in response 
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to “Are fires hot?” a child might say “All fires are” or “Yes, all fires are”). We did 
not include as qualifications those cases in which a participant simply repeated 
information in the question (e.g., “Are all fires hot?” “Yes, they’re all hot.”). Thus, 
qualifications, by definition, supplied information that could not be assumed in the 
question.  
As expected, most “some” qualifications were given in response to 
narrow-scope properties (90%), and most “all” qualifications were given in 
response to wide-scope properties (96%). We therefore included only those 
qualifications that were provided for the expected scope (i.e., “some” for narrow-
scope properties and “all” for wide-scope properties). However, it is important to 
note that the patterns of results reported below are largely equivalent when all 
qualifications are analyzed. Our main question is what sorts of qualifications 
children and adults provided for generics and how these compared to their 
qualifications for the other wording conditions. Because the different wording 
conditions differed in terms of which qualifications were possible (see above), we 
conducted a series of paired t tests comparing qualifications of generic 
responses with qualifications of either “all” or “some” responses, within each age 
group separately (see Table 2.1). As can be seen, 3-year-olds did not distinguish 
between generics and either “all” or “some” in the qualifications they provided. 
Both 4-year-olds and adults, however, showed distinct patterns of response: 
more “some” qualifications for generic questions than for “all” questions, and 
more “all” qualifications for “some” questions than for generic questions. The fact 
that generic questions are more often qualified with “some” indicates that 
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generics do not themselves imply “some.” Overall, this pattern suggests that 
generics are distinct from both “all” and “some.” 
Individual response patterns. The finding that generics were in-between 
“some” and “all” raises the question of whether individual participants consistently 
treated generics as intermediate or whether instead this finding is the result of 
averaging across participants. To address the issue, we examined the response 
patterns of individual participants. Because the data were complex, and because 
the wording effects were most pronounced on the narrow-scope properties, we 
focused specifically on this subset of the data. (Wide-scope properties tended to 
yield ceiling effects, and irrelevant properties yielded floor effects.) We coded 
each participant’s responses to the narrow-scope properties into one of four 
categories: (a) Generic = intermediate. These participants had higher scores for 
“some” than for generic and higher scores for generic than for “all” (“some” > 
generic > “all”). In other words, they treated generic as intermediate between 
“some” and “all.” (b) Generic = “all.” These participants had higher scores for 
“some” than for generic and “all” and had equivalent scores for generic and “all” 
(“some” > generic, “all”). In other words, they differentiated “some” from “all” and 
treated generic as equivalent to “all.” (c) Generic = “some.” These participants 
had higher scores for “some” and generic than for “all” and had equivalent scores 
for “some” and generic (“some,” generic > “all”). In other words, they 
differentiated “some” from “all,” and treated generic as equivalent to “some.” (d) 
Other. This included all other response patterns. Results are shown in Table 2.2. 
For both 4-year-olds and adults, the most frequent response pattern was to treat 
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generics as intermediate between “all” and “some.” Among those who did not, 
some participants treated generics as equivalent to “some,” and some treated 
generics as equivalent to “all,” though the former was slightly more common. 
Most of the 3-year-olds showed “other” response patterns, primarily because 
most of them did not differentiate “all” and “some.” 
Item analyses. We also examined the results for items considered 
individually to determine the generalizability of the results across items. As we 
did in the individual response analysis, we focused solely on the narrow-scope 
property items. There were 12 narrow-scope items for 4-year-olds and adults and 
6 narrow-scope items for 3-year-olds. We coded responses to each of these 
items into the same categories as those described above for the individual 
response patterns: (a) generic = intermediate (“some” > generic > “all”), (b) 
generic = “all” (“some” > generic, “all”), (c) generic = “some” (“some,” generic > 
“all”), and (d) “other.” Three-year-olds showed little consistency: 1 item showed 
Pattern a, 2 showed Pattern b, 1 showed Pattern c, and 2 showed no pattern 
(i.e., Pattern d). For 4-year-olds, however, the items showed much greater 
consistency: Fully half the items (6 out of 12) showed Pattern a, whereby 
generics are intermediate in scope between “all” and “some.” Three of the items 
showed generics as equivalent to “some,” and the remaining 3 items showed no 
consistent pattern. Among the adults, all 12 items showed Pattern a, in which 
generics were intermediate in scope between “all” and “some.” 
Posttest. The posttest was given to 3-year-olds only, to test their 
understanding of “all” and “some” in a concrete context with immediately 
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perceptible referents. Because of experimenter error, 2 of the 3-year-olds did not 
receive the posttest, so a total of 16 children were included in the analyses. For 
each participant, we scored a response of “yes” as 1 and a response of “no” as 0 
(see Figure 2.5 for results). Overall, children performed extremely well on this 
task. Children typically applied “all” just to the situation in which four of the four 
crayons were in the box. In contrast, they typically applied “some” to the 
situations in which two, three, or (less often) four crayons were in the box. 
We entered the scores into a 2 (wording: all or some) X 4 (number: zero, 
two, three, or four) ANOVA. Results indicated clear effects of wording, F(1, 15)= 
45.00, p < .001; number, F(3, 45) = 30.80, p < .001; and Wording X Number, F(3, 
45) = 24.45, p < .001. When comparing “all” and “some” trials directly with paired 
t tests, we found that children significantly distinguished the two kinds of 
questions on trials asking about two out of four crayons (p < .001), three out of 
four crayons (p < .01), and four out of four crayons (p < .05). Furthermore, 
individual children’s response patterns also suggested that these children had 
consistent understanding. Eleven out of the 16 children showed the correct 
pattern on “all” (i.e., “yes” to four out of four only), and 12 out of the 16 children 
showed the correct pattern on “some” (i.e., “no” to zero out of four and “yes” to 
two out of four and three out of four; for the purposes of this analysis, we did not 





Overall, these results are consistent with a semantic analysis in which by 
the time children are 4 years of age, generics imply broad generalizations but 
also allow for exceptions. In other words, 4-year-olds and adults interpret 
generics as being reducible to neither “all” nor “some.” Like “all,” generics are 
more appropriate for wide-scope generalizations (e.g., “Fires are hot”) than for 
narrow-scope properties (e.g., “Girls have curly hair”). Yet like “some,” generics 
are nonetheless endorsed above chance for narrow-scope properties (e.g., “Girls 
have curly hair”). Individual response patterns further reveal that most 4-year-
olds and adults consistently treat generics as intermediate between “all” and 
“some” in meaning. However, in their spontaneous qualifications, 4-year-olds and 
adults treat generics as more like the quantifier “all.” 
These distinctions (between generic and “all” and between generic and 
“some”) are subtle and so provide a powerful test of children’s grasp of generic 
implications. First, the distinction between “all” and generics emerges despite the 
fact that both noun phrase types imply the category as a whole, differing only in 
their commitment to every instance. At times generics are indistinguishable 
from “all,” being used to convey properties true of every category member (e.g., 
“Dogs are mammals”). Nonetheless, generics allow for the possibility of 
counterexamples in a way that “all” does not (e.g., “Dogs have four legs” is not 
invalidated by the existence of three-legged dogs). Second, the distinction 
between generics and “some” is subtle in that the bare plural form has dual 
functions, at times referring to generics (e.g., “Bears like to eat ants”) and at 
times referring to an indefinite plural (e.g., “I saw bears in the park yesterday”). 
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Note that the indefinite plural is comparable to a noun phrase with “some” (i.e., “I 
saw bears in the park yesterday” is comparable in meaning to “I saw some bears 
in the park yesterday”). Given these potential confusions—on the one hand 
between generics and “all,” and on the other hand between generics and 
“some”—it is all the more impressive that 4-year-olds distinguish among the three 
forms. 
We found that, in striking contrast to the data from 4-year-olds and adults, 
3-year-olds did not distinguish “all,” generic, and “some.” Their difficulty cannot 
be attributed to lack of knowledge (e.g., not knowing that fires are hot or that girls 
can have either curly hair or straight hair), because they did consistently 
distinguish wide from narrow from irrelevant properties. For example, they were 
more likely to endorse the proposition that fires are hot than that girls have curly 
hair. Instead, the problem is specifically with differentiating among the three 
types of wording. For example, they were statistically as likely to accept that all 
girls have curly hair as they were to accept that some girls have curly hair. 
However, it is also not the case that 3-year-olds know nothing about the 
meanings of “all” and “some,” because they performed extremely well on the all–
some posttest, which used a small set of concrete, available objects. Instead, 3-
year-olds had difficulty extending this knowledge beyond the realm of instances 
that were immediately present to a consideration of categories in the abstract. 
In summary, the results are clear: 4-year-old children and adults 
distinguish between generics and statements using “all” or “some.” In both cases 
(generic vs. “all” and generic vs. “some”) the distinction is a subtle one. Generics 
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are often characterized as being generally true, yet even so children honor a 
distinction between generics and the more inclusive “all.” On the other hand, the 
distinction between generics and “some” is upheld despite the fact that the same 
form of the noun phrase (bare plural) is used in both generic utterances (e.g., 
“Bears are ferocious”) and indefinite utterances (e.g., “I saw bears at the zoo 
yesterday”). Thus, the semantic features of generics presented in the introduction 
to this article (neither reducible to “all” nor reducible to indefinite “some”) are 
appreciated by adults and preschool children alike. 
One important interpretive issue needs to be addressed. Namely, it is 
possible that the intermediate pattern of responses (with generics receiving a 
number of “yes” responses, that is, in between their responses to “all” and their 
responses to “some”) could indicate confusion or mixed responses rather than a 
consistent generic interpretation. However, several additional pieces of 
information argue against this alternative account. First, the 4-year-olds show a 
response pattern that is in all respects quite similar to that of adults on the same 
task. Second, children’s spontaneous qualifications likewise are consistent with 
the construal that children distinguish generics from “all” and “some.” Third, the 
findings from other published reports using different research methods (Gelman 
& Raman, 2003; Gelman et al., 2002) are consistent with the interpretation 
provided for the present results. Finally, the data from a production task reported 
along with the present comprehension task in Hollander, Gelman, and Star 
(2002) further bolster the idea that children treat generics as distinct from “some'. 
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 Importantly, the present study indicates that generics are understood 
early in development, by 4 years of age. This is a surprising finding given the 
subtlety of the semantic distinctions under consideration. However, there is a 
second finding as well, namely, that performance changes rather abruptly 
between 3 and 4 years of age. Three-year-olds displayed no sensitivity to the 
distinction between “all,” generics, and “some” wording, whereas 4-year-olds 
were notably adult-like in their responses. However, children’s failure to 
differentiate among the linguistic cues provided does not demonstrate that 3-
year-olds lack generic understanding. Indeed, the overall means for generics do 
not change significantly with age (see Figure 2.1). Three-year olds’ response 
patterns on the generic questions are statistically indistinguishable from those of 
4-year-olds and adults. All of the significant age changes are with “all” and 
“some.” We therefore propose the following interpretation: Under certain 
conditions (e.g., when the information-processing load of the task becomes too 
high), children ignore the quantifiers “all” and “some” and treat all three versions 
of the questions as generic. These result patterns lead to the intriguing 
implication that generics may be a kind of default for young children. When 
information-processing demands are high, children may ignore quantifiers and 
interpret a wide range of utterances as generic. 
This interpretation remains speculative at the present time. In future 
research, it would be important to test the generics-as-default hypothesis more 
directly. For example, one could place older children under increased processing 
demands to determine if generic interpretations increase in such contexts. 
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Alternative interpretations would also need to be tested more directly. For 
example, it is also possible that 3-year-olds are ignoring the form of the questions 
entirely and simply answering “yes” on the basis of how readily they can retrieve 
examples of the property being linked to the kind mentioned. One way to begin to 
address this question would be to examine 3-year-olds’ understanding with 
properties that are highly available in context but not true of the generic kind. 
For example, 3-year-olds could be shown a picture of a dozen glasses of 
chocolate milk and then asked, “Does milk have chocolate in it?” If their 
responses to this narrow-scope question are influenced simply by the availability 
of instances that match the predicate, then they should tend to answer “yes.” In 
contrast, if their responses indicate a true generic response, then they should 
give a response intermediate between “yes” and “no” (as they have done in the 
present study). 
It is also intriguing that 3-year-olds succeeded on the all–some posttest, 
which used a small set of concrete, available objects. The reasons why 3-year-
olds have difficulty applying “all” and “some” to categories considered more 
broadly remain unknown at the present time. Perhaps the task poses 
insurmountable information processing demands by requiring the child to hold in 
mind abstract sets and subsets (e.g., the set of girls and the subset of girls with 
curly hair) as well as the scope of the quantifier. A similar argument has been 
made with regard to young children’s understanding of basic–subordinate level 
inclusion relations (Johnson, Scott, & Mervis, 1997). Perhaps 3-year-old children 
would have performed better on all three forms of the question in the main task 
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(“all,” “some,” and generic) if we had provided pictures depicting accurate 
samples of the categories in question, such as a set of girls, some with curly hair 
and some with straight hair. More generally, an important task for future research 
will be to determine what underlies the developmental changes identified in this 
study. 
We conclude that preschool children readily grasp the semantics of 
generic sentences even though generic noun phrases are neither overtly marked 
in language (i.e., there is no single linguistic form for conveying them) and even 
though their meaning could be characterized as less clear-cut compared to the 
logical precision of  “all” and “some.” Taken together, these findings suggest that 
generic concepts are readily available in young children’s category 
representations. Just as children are capable of reasoning about everyday 












Study 2: Generic Language and Extending Novel Words 
 
Study 1 of this dissertation demonstrated that adults and children as 
young as 4 years old are sensitive to generic wording.  They appropriately 
distinguished generics from the quantifier ‘all’ on the one hand, and from ‘some’ 
on the other, when asked questions about familiar categories and properties.  In 
Studies 2 and 3, I ask whether adults and children can use generic language in 
the service of learning new words.  In particular, I am concerned with how 
generics specially link properties to categories. Generic utterances, such as 
“Snakes have scales,” seem to imply that the property predicated of the category 
is relatively central (Krifka et al., 1995; Lyons, 1977), particularly compared to 
non-generic utterances, such as “This snake has scales.”   
There are two consequences of this hypothesis, with two corresponding 
implications for how one might test this notion.  One consequence is that generic 
language should lead children to infer that a new property thus expressed 
generalizes broadly to a range of category members. For example, if children did 
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not know that bears climb trees, then one could examine whether “Bears climb 
trees” leads children to assume that even atypical bears climb trees, in contrast 
to non-generic utterances (e.g., “This bear climbs trees” or “Some bears climb 
trees”). One way to test this first consequence would be to teach children a novel 
fact (either generic or specific) about a familiar category, test how widely children 
generalize that fact to other instances.  This is in fact what Gelman, Star, and 
Flukes (2002) did, finding evidence that preschool children extend novel 
properties more broadly within the target familiar category (e.g., bears), when the 
novel property is expressed generically vs. non-generically. 
The second consequence of this hypothesis is that generic language 
should lead children to consult the novel property when identifying new instances 
of a category.  For example, if children had never encountered the category 
“tapirs” before, but heard a new property expressed generically (e.g., “Tapirs 
have white-tipped ears”), they should consult the generic property to determine 
whether or not a new animal is a member of the category “tapirs”).  In order to 
test this second consequence, one would teach children a novel fact (either 
generic or specific) about a novel category, then test which features children use 
to identify new instances of the category.  As I detail later in Chapters 3 and 4, 
this is the approach taken in the present studies. 
 
3.1 Do Generics Highlight Properties as Central to a Category? 
Prasada and his colleagues (Prasada, 2000; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006) 
have recently considered how generic language might convey information about 
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the relationship between properties and categories.  In creating a model for the 
acquisition of “commonsense”, or “generic” knowledge about the world, Prasada 
emphasizes the importance of generic language.  Generic sentences, on this 
view, can be interpreted to indicate a “principled connection” between the 
category and predicated property.  For example, “Dogs have four legs” may be 
interpreted as “By virtue of what they are, dogs have four legs”.  Indeed, Prasada 
and Dillingham (2006) found that adults endorse this gloss as true. They argue 
that generics interpreted as reflecting a principled connection further motivate 
normative expectations about instances of the type in question—that is, for 
example, because “Dogs have four legs” by virtue of what they are, we can 
expect new instances of dogs that we encounter to have four legs, too.  Although 
Prasada demonstrates that not all generic sentences express principled 
connections (instead, others express mere statistical connections; e.g., the 
sentence “Barns are red” does not imply that “By virtue of what they are, barns 
are red”), his work advances the intriguing notion that at least some generics 
imply that a property is connected to the category of which it is predicated in 
deep, identity-relevant ways.   
Indeed, Prasada (2000) and Gelman (2004) suggest that generic 
language may be critical to the acquisition of generic knowledge.  Prasada 
outlines a formal system for learning new facts about kinds of things that 
bypasses the need for extensive experience of instances.  Such a formal system, 
he argues, can allow for the development of kind-concepts without the 
involvement of inductive processes that, for instance, are required in prototype- 
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or exemplar-based models of concept acquisition and representation. Prasada 
posits that single instances of a kind can serve as input to a representational 
system for “commonsense conception”, and that one potentially important 
method whereby young children in particular may glean generic knowledge in 
short order is from the generic language to which they are exposed.  Similarly, 
Gelman (2004) points out that without language in general it would be impossible 
to predicate properties of a kind as a whole:  “...no process of enumerating and 
displaying examples can unambiguously convey that birds (as a kind) have 
hollow bones, whereas this is an uncomplicated linguistic effort” (p. 32).  Gelman 
further suggests that generic language is important to teaching children specific 
category-wide generalizations. 
In the present study I ask how children and adults interpret generics in 
support of the judgments about category membership inherent to extending novel 
words.  Before turning to the study, I first review some recent issues regarding 
novel word extensions in young children.  
 
3.2 Linking Word and World 
 In recent chapters on early word learning, Waxman (2004,  Waxman & 
Lidz, 2006) summarizes evidence about words and how they appear to be 
intimately tied to category-based reasoning.  Much debate swirls around this 
work, questions central to controversies in cognitive science and developmental 
psychology—the primacy of perceptual or conceptual processes (Booth 
&Waxman, 2006; Smith & Samuelson, 2006), whether acquisition is guided by 
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domain-specific or domain-general principles and processes (Bloom, 2001; 
Bloom & Markson, 2000; Waxman & Booth, 2000), and the particulars of the 
relationship between language and concept, to name a few.  The central 
question is really the classic problem of induction laid out by Quine (1960) asking 
how the child comes to diagnose what, of the myriad possibilities in any given 
scenario, a word she hears might refer to.  That is, there are things one might 
talk about, and there are words in the speech stream that native speakers seem 
to use effortlessly to talk about them.  The child’s task is to hook the two up, and 
the researcher’s task is to discover how this process might happen. Research 
into the particulars of the process has come at the problem from both the world 
end and the word end of it.  There are important concerns on both ends—which 
relevant aspects of the world, and of the speech stream, do learners attend to 
and under what circumstances? 
One especially prominent sort of experimental paradigm used to 
investigate the connections between word and concept is the “novel word 
extension” task.  Much can be varied, but the basic frame is for the researcher to 
introduce a new word and to note how that word is thereafter extended to new 
objects. The participant’s willingness to extend the novel label to a new object is 
taken as evidence of her diagnosis regarding its category identity—i.e., her 
decision that the object counts as another member of the category initially 
labeled with the novel word.   In other words, the researcher establishes an initial 
word-to-world mapping with the initial labeling of the target object, and the 
participant is asked to extend the word to new instances.  Researchers thus 
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investigate in the lab the constraints on these mapping processes hypothesized 
to exist in the ‘real’ world of acquiring words and knowledge. 
 Using a novel word extension paradigm, Markman and Hutchinson (1984) 
asked whether preschoolers could demonstrate knowledge of taxonomic kinds, 
moving beyond the thematic relations thought to dominate their early sorting and 
classification behaviors, and whether situating a task in the realm of word-
learning would bring such competence to the fore.  The authors reasoned that 
when children hear a new word, they make a “taxonomic assumption” about its 
meaning, and would extend the label to objects of the same kind.  And they 
found that preschoolers who were given a novel label for a familiar kind—e.g., a 
cow labeled a ‘dax’ in puppet language—were more likely to chose the 
taxonomic alternative (e.g., a pig) than those participants who were not taught a 
novel label and were instead asked for another ‘one’. Conversely, children who 
heard a novel label were less likely to make thematic choices (a pail of milk) than 
children in a no-word control condition. The presence of a label seemed to affect 
how preschool-aged children thought about what goes together. 
 Language appears to influence categorical reasoning from very early in 
life.  At first, the child does not distinguish among types of words. Waxman and 
Booth (2003) found that for 11 month-old infants,  participants hearing either a 
noun or an adjective were more likely to extract the commonality provided (either 
color or taxonomic kind) in an array of objects.  By just a few months of age later, 
however, children are coming to a more differentiated set of expectations 
regarding words and the specific kinds of commonalities to which they refer. 
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Waxman and Lidz (2006) review evidence that by about 14 months of age, 
children demonstrate a specific noun-object category link, and that by about 21 
months of age, children demonstrate a distinct adjective-property link (Waxman & 
Markow, 1998). There is also evidence that by about 18 months of age they 
seem to distinguish verbs from nouns (Echols and Marti, 2004).  Thus, initially 
broad connections between words and commonalities among objects are honed 
into the kinds of specific connections between linguistic form classes and the 
relevant dimensions of the world they capture. The infant studies used 
preferential looking and related infant-research paradigms, but the abilities of 
children as young as 2 years to make use of formal cues in determining the 
extensions of novel words, and the conceptual apparatus apparently also 
engaged in such demonstrations, has been well established empirically.  
Preschool-aged children have been shown to be sensitive to the distinctions 
between and among count nouns, mass nouns, proper nouns, and adjectives 
(Gleitman et al., 1987; Hall, 1994; Hall et al., 1993, 2003; Soja et al., 1991; 
Waxman & Kosowski, 1991) when learning new words.   
 
3.3 Linking Category and Property with Generic Expressions 
 In the “cascading” developmental process of language development 
(Waxman, 2004), as rudimentary lexicons become more well established, might 
the connections between words and concepts include the fleshing out of kind 
concepts via generic language?  If nouns serve as invitations to form object 
categories, then might generic language, for older children, be invitations to 
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associate properties with categories?  Just as words serve to focus infants’ 
attention toward commonalities among objects, and later specific form classes—
noun or adjective, for instance—serve to differentially direct children’s attention to 
the relevant, specific kinds of commonalities among objects, we might expect 
generic language to highlight properties that are relatively “essential” (Gelman, 
2003) to membership in a kind.   
In some ways, the novel word extension study can be considered an 
experimental re-creation of the “dubbing ceremony” (Putnam, 1975; Waxman, 
1999).  That children are willing to apply the label beyond the individual object 
named indicates that the mapping is not a word-object connection, but rather a 
word-category link (Waxman 1999), and therefore a window onto the dimensions 
along which learners’ categories may be built.  There is some controversy in this 
regard over how much more than perceptual processing we should attribute to 
the language-learner as she extends a novel word (see, for example, Gelman, 
2004; Smith & Samuelson, 2006; Smith et al., 2003; Waxman & Booth, 2006).   
A number of important studies have found that children, and in some 
cases adults, exhibit a “shape bias” in learning new words, picking out similarly 
shaped objects (e.g., choosing a ‘nail’ as a match to a target of a similarly 
shaped ‘carrot’) instead of category matches (e.g., choosing a ‘potato’) (Baldwin, 
1992; Imai et al., 1994). Some theorists have posited that “dumb” attentional 
mechanisms can account for language acquisition (Smith et al., 1996; Smith et 
al., 2003).  Similarity in shape is surely a factor in decisions about category 
membership, but in numerous instances its importance is overridden by other 
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considerations, including sharing a label in studies of inductive inference (e.g., 
Gelman & Coley, 1990), having the same function (e.g., Kemler Nelson et al., 
2000), or having other critical similarities (e.g., Booth & Waxman, 2002; 
Diesendruck et al., 2003).   
In the current study, I ask whether children can make use of generic 
language to highlight the centrality of a property to a category.  Furthermore, the 
current study provides converging evidence concerning children’s (and adults’) 
capacity to distinguish the semantic implications of generic versus non-generic 
sentences.   
 
3.4 The Current Study 
In Study 2, I ask whether predicating properties of a depicted object using 
generic language serves to highlight the importance of that property when 
making judgments of category identity.  For each of a series of novel items, I 
present an item, label it, and describe a property while systematically varying the 
wording:  in one condition the property is described with a generic sentence (e.g., 
“Bants have stripes”), in another condition the property is described with a 
specific sentence (e.g.,”This bant has stripes”).  After labeling and describing the 
item, the researcher asks which of two new items can also be labeled with the 
new word:  one item that matches the target item on the property predicated—
either generically or non-generically—and one option that matches the target on 
overall perceptual similarity. 
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 In this way, my task is analogous to other investigations into the 
expectations children may demonstrate about the connections between language 
and categorization. Also, as in other such studies, the conceptual is pitted 
against the perceptual.  Gelman and colleagues (e.g., Gelman & Coley, 1990) 
have conducted a number of experiments showing that when children are led via 
labeling to believe that two depicted animals are the same kind of thing (because 
they share a name) they overcome a baseline reliance on perceptual similarity 
cues when reasoning inductively about unseen properties.   In the present study, 
I ask whether use of a generic expression permits children to extend a label to 
instances that are less similar overall to the initially named instance.  Can generic 
language, potentially an important means for conveying information about kinds, 
also be the kind of clue regarding category membership that allows perceptual 
similarity to be overridden in name extension?  
I use novel animals as the depicted objects here, assuming that the more 
richly structured categories represented by animal kinds are the most typically 
expressed with generic language.  Indeed, past work consistently demonstrates 
that generic language is more commonly used when talking about animals than 
when talking about artifacts (e.g., Gelman et al., 1998; Goldin-Meadow, 






All participants were native speakers of English.  There were 33 children, 
aged 4 years 8 months to 6 years 1 month, with a mean age of 5 years 2 months.  
Sixteen children were included in the control condition and 17 in the experimental 
condition.  All child participants attended preschool centers affiliated with the 
same university from which adult participants were drawn.  There were 36 adults, 
12 in the control condition and 24 in the experimental condition.  All adult 
participants were students at a large, mid-western university, enrolled in an 
Introductory Psychology course.  Their participation in the study partially fulfilled 
class requirements.   
Materials 
There were 12 item-sets, each comprising 3 pictures of novel animals:  
one target instance to receive a verbal label from the experimenter (herein 
referred to as the 'labeled' instance) and two choice pictures-- one matched with 
the labeled instance on the highlighted property (herein referred to as the 
'predicated-property match' choice) and one matched with the labeled instance 
on overall perceptual similarity (herein referred to as the 'overall-similarity match' 
choice).  The overall-similarity match choice was created in each case to be 
highly perceptually similar to the labeled instance, but to lack the property shared 
by the labeled-instance and the predicated-property match.  Furthermore, the 
overall-similarity match differed from the labeled instance on at least two other 
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dimensions, one of which was always subtle variation in coloring.   Appendix D 
shows the item-sets. The predicated-property matches were drawn to be more 
obviously different from the labeled instance, particularly in contour, but were 
kept at least somewhat similar to the labeled instance. Thus, all 3 items in each 
set could conceivably be seen as related.  This was done to ensure that the 
labeling would remain plausible for both choice items (Davidson & Gelman, 
1990).   
Items were divided into an A and a B group for the purpose of 
counterbalancing items across wording conditions.  Although the creatures were 
novel ones, in most cases they resembled known animals, and so animal-types 
were balanced across the groups as well.  Each group included two mammal-like 
creatures, one water-dwelling creature, and two reptile-like creatures.   
 A nonsense name of either two or three syllables (equal numbers of each, 
counterbalanced across the two item-groups) was assigned to each labeled 
animal .Group A names were: bant, dorn, bleen, tepin, febbit, vorzyd; group B 
names were: fep, plog, scred, kevta, bactra, yanci.  The types of properties 
stipulated of the animals also fell into types which were counterbalanced across 
item groups.  Each group included predications about the target animal's color, 
texture (e.g., wooly), color-pattern (e.g., striped), salient and/or 
disproportionately-sized parts (e.g., big ears), and number of parts (e.g., has 2 




Children were tested individually in a quiet room in their school.  Each 
child was told beforehand that he or she was going to be playing a special 
‘game’.  At the beginning of the session, the experimenter sat across from the 
child at a table and explained that the child would “be seeing some pictures of 
animals”. Adult participants were tested individually in a small office in a 
university building.  They were told that they would be engaging in an experiment 
designed to be conducted with young children.  The participant sat across a desk 
from the experimenter, and the protocol was identical to that used with children. 
 For each of the twelve trials, the experimenter presented the labeled-
instance drawing and stated its name, for example, “This is a kevta”.  For a 
Generic trial, the experimenter then said, “Let me tell you something about 
kevtas.  Kevtas have two humps”.  For a Non-Generic trial, the wording was 
instead, “Let me tell you something about this kevta.  This kevta has two humps”.  
The labeled-instance drawing was left on the table for the participant to observe, 
and two new drawings—the overall-similarity match choice and the predicated-
property match choice—were placed side by side and above the labeled-
instance.  The left-right placement of the overall-similarity match and predicated-
property match choices was counterbalanced across trials for each participant.  
The experimenter called the participant’s attention to the two new drawings, and 
asked, “Which of these is also a kevta?”   
Trials were blocked into two 6-item sets, one block using generic wording 
and one block using non-generic wording, and presentation order of the blocks 
was counterbalanced across participants.  The 2 item lists (“A” and “B” groups 
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described above) were counterbalanced between the wording conditions so that 
each item appeared equally often in each wording, and the trials within each 
block were randomly ordered.  
For the control condition, the same scripts were used as for the 
experimental condition, but the statements giving information, generically in one 
block and non-generically in the other, were omitted and replaced with a 
repeating of the labeling sentence, for emphasis (e.g., “This is a kevta.  This is a 
kevta”).  The query language (e.g., “Which of these is also a kevta?”) remained 
the same as in the experimental condition.  Left-right placement of the overall-
similarity and predicated-property match choices was counterbalanced as in the 
experimental condition.   
Predictions  
I hypothesized that children and adults would be more likely to choose the 
predicated-property match in the Generic condition than in the Non-Generic 
condition. I expected that the generic phrasing would be interpreted by 
participants as a reference to the kind this novel name picks out, and that the 
property therefore would be taken as more central to category identity than when 
it is presented in specific terms.  I argue that associating a property with an 
object using generic sentences highlights the importance of that property to 
membership in the category.   
It could be else-wise.  For one, it could be that preschool-age children in 
particular are not sensitive to the subtle language differences between the 
generic and the non-generic wording conditions.  It could be that they would 
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simply ignore the differences between the sentences “This plog is green” and 
“Plogs are green”.  In this case, when faced with a forced-choice and all three 
options (the labeled-instance, the overall-similarity match, and the predicated-
property match), they may be more likely to choose the picture that they decided 
most closely resembles the target instance, presumably the overall-similarity 
match.  Or, also a possibility, they may be more likely to choose the property-
match regardless of the wording-condition, because they heard in both cases the 
property ‘green’ associated with the novel name ‘plog’ and latched onto this 
property as a basis for making decisions about how to extend the novel word.   
The control condition was included to help establish what baseline 
responding would be.  I expected that in the control condition participants would 
be more likely to choose the overall-similarity match than in either of the 
experimental conditions (generic or non-generic wording). In other words, I 
expected that the control condition, in which the property shared by the labeled-
instance and the predicated-property choice was not highlighted with language of 
any sort, would result in fewer predicated-property choices than in either of the 
experimental conditions.     
 Results  
Responses were scored as 1 for a property-match choice, and as 0 for a 
shape-match choice.  The scores were summed across the 6 items in each 
testing block (generic wording or non-generic wording) for each participant, 
yielding one score per block ranging from 0-6 (where 0 represents all overall-
similarity choices, and 6 represents all predicated-property choices).   
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These scores were entered into a 2 (age: adult, child) X 2 (wording: 
generic, non-generic) X 2 (order: generic-first, nongeneric-first) ANOVA.   The 
effect of wording was significant, F(1,37) = 36.27, p < .005. As predicted, when 
participants heard information stated generically about the novel animal they 
saw, they were significantly more likely to say that the picture-choice possessing 
the predicated property was a member of the target category than when the 
property was predicated using non-generic phrasing.  There was also a 
significant Age X Wording interaction, F(1,37) = 8.22, p < .05.   
In order to determine whether the condition effect held up within each age 
group separately, I also conducted separate 2 (wording: generic, non-generic) x 
2 (order:  generic-first, non-generic-first) ANOVAs on responses from adults and 
from children.  As predicted, there was a main effect of Wording for both adults, 
F(1,22) = 32.37, p < .001, and children, F(1, 15) = 13.99, p < .005. Additionally, 
there was a non-significant Wording X Order interaction for children, F(1,15) = 
4.40, p = .053.  Pairwise comparisons indicate that while the effect of wording 
was significant for adults in both the generic-first and nongeneric-first orders 
(both ps < .01), for children the effect of wording was significant only when the 
non-generic wording block was presented first (p < .005).    
Comparisons by t-test to chance levels (50%, or 3 out of 6) shows that in 
the generic wording condition, both adults and children chose the predicated-
property match significantly more often than what would be expected by chance 
(M = 5.50 for adults, M = 5.24 for children).  On the non-generic wording trials, 
however, adults chose the predicated-property at chance levels (M = 2.3), 
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whereas children’s predicated-property choices were significantly higher than 
chance (M = 4.09).   
Control Condition 
The control condition was included to measure baseline responding to the 
item-sets used in the experimental conditions, in the absence of any linguistic 
input to the participant regarding the predicated property.  Responses were 
coded as in the experimental condition, as 1 for a property-match choice, and as 
0 for a shape-match choice.  The scores were summed across the 12 items for 
each participant, yielding one score per block ranging from 0-12 (where 0 
represents all overall-similarity choices, and 12 represents all predicated-property 
choices). For the purposes of comparisons to the experimental conditions, each 
participant’s score was divided by 2.    
Adults in the control condition were significantly less likely to choose the 
predicated-property match than would be expected by chance (M = 1.00; p < 
.001), but children were not (M = 3.25).  Comparisons of the control condition to 
each of the wording conditions (generic; non-generic) by independent-sample t-
tests  showed that adults (p < .001) and children (p < .001) chose the predicated-
property match significantly less often for the control than for the generic wording 
condition.  Furthermore, both adults (p = .054, one-tailed) and children (p = .044, 
one-tailed) also chose the predicated-property match significantly less often for 
the control than for the non-generic wording condition.  Thus, for both age-groups 
responses were affected by mentioning the properties even in the non-generic 




 To ensure that there weren’t any systematic differences attributable to 
variability in the items, the rate of predicated-property match responding was 
calculated for each of the 12 items.  Analysis of the child responses indicated 
that 9 of the 12 items showed the expected response pattern, with a higher 
percentage of predicated-property match choices for the generic wording 
condition than for the non-generic condition.  For adults, all 12 items showed the 




 I set out to ask whether adults and preschool-aged children distinguish 
between information provided about a category generically and specifically.  I 
expected that when participants were told that a depicted animal possessed a 
property, their subsequent word extensions would be affected by whether a 
generic or non-generic phrasing was used to convey the connection.  The results 
indicated that this expectation was borne out.  Analyses indicated that overall, 
generic wording yielded more selections of the predicated-property match than 
non-generic wording.  This effect was more pronounced for adults than for 
children, but was significant at both age groups.  Although the wording 
differentiation was quite subtle (“bants” vs. “this bant”), and although in both 
wording conditions the predicated property was mentioned, both children and 
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adults treated the generic and non-generic wording condition consistently 
differently. 
 Furthermore, children were more likely to choose the predicated property 
in the generic condition than in the control condition, in which no property was 
mentioned by means of language.  However, children were also more likely to 
choose the predicated property in the non-generic condition than in the control 
condition.  Indeed, children’s responses in the control condition did not differ 
significantly from chance.  This result was unexpected, and presents a problem 
for interpreting children’s responses in the experimental conditions.   
With regard to the control condition, I had predicted that in the absence of 
any predicated property information, overall similarity in shape would have 
guided children’s extensions, as they did adults’.  Many studies have found that 
overall similarity in shape is critically important to how children extend words 
(Landau et al. 1998; Smith et al. 1996; Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003). However, it 
is also possible that items that we intended to represent shape matches were not 
perceived as such by young children.  Prior research has shown that there are 
important developmental changes in children’s perception of shape (Abecassis, 
Sera, et al., 2001). Indeed, a closer inspection of the items revealed that some of 
the predicated properties in fact may have affected judgments of overall shape.  
For example, although “large ears” was intended to be a shape match on one 
triad, animals that have the same large ears are also more alike in head-shape 
than animals that differ in their ear-size.  The 3 triads for which children did not 
show the expected pattern of choices (generic wording leading to increased 
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choosing of the predicated property matches) were all potentially affected in this 
way.  
 A further consideration is that we deliberately designed the item sets such 
that the contrast between shape-match and property-match not be too stark.  For 
example, if a set consisted of two rabbit-shaped items and a snake-shaped item, 
the overall similarity between the two rabbit-shaped items would be so extreme 
that one would not expect wording effects to be sufficiently powerful to overcome 
the perceptual sway.  Indeed, Davidson and Gelman (1990) found that preschool 
children are confused by stimuli sets in which animals that looked quite different 
were nonetheless given the same label, and animals that looked very similar 
were given different labels.  They found evidence that this was particularly so for 
novel words, and argue that children may expect a minimum amount of similarity 
before they accept objects would share a label.  Thus, although the similarity 
among members in each item-set may be justified, it could have affected the 
judgments of child participants in particular by creating a trio of animals which 
looked sufficiently similar in overall shape that the property predicated of the 
target instance in the experimental condition was saliently ‘a match’, and thus 
guided participants’ choices about label extension in some instances.  
Whether these patterns reflect differences between adults’ and children’s 
interpretation of overall shape, of the similarity space created within a set of 
items which were drawn to be plausibly of the same kind, or variation in 
conceptions of perceptual similarities relevant to labeling specifically, is unclear, 
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and requires further exploration.  Therefore, a follow-up study was conducted.  













Study 3:  Generic Language and Novel Word Extension—The Role of Shape 
 
Reference to kinds of things, as opposed to individuals, is readily 
established via generic expressions.  The sentence “Snakes have scales” seems 
a straightforward and natural way to speak about snakes as a kind of animal 
generally, as a category.  This stands in contrast to the sentence “This snake has 
scales”, for example, which picks out a specific one.  If, for example, each 
sentence was uttered in the presence of a single snake, real (and, presumably, a 
safe distance away) or depicted, would the hearer make different assumptions 
about the relationship between being a snake and having scales?  Intuition tells 
us that if we are told about snakes as in the first case, with the bare plural noun 
phrase, we might expect the possession of scales to be relatively widespread 
among snakes. We might even decide that snakes must possess scales in order 
to be categorized as snakes and not some other, related creature.  But upon 
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hearing the non-generic sentence, our judgments about the relevance of the 
property stipulated of the category in question might be different.  
   While the subtlety involved in distinguishing between generic and non-
generic utterances necessitates consideration of a wide range of formal and 
pragmatic factors (Gelman & Raman, 2003; Gelman & Bloom, in press; Gelman, 
2004), until recently we knew very little about how adults and, especially, 
children, interpret generic language at all.  In the general introduction to this 
dissertation, I review a growing body of research on children’s exposure to 
generic expressions in the speech of their caretakers (Gelman et al., 1998; 
Gelman & Tardif, 1998; Gelman et al., in press), and on their use of the forms in 
spontaneous speech (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005; Gelman et al., in press).   
Further, I argue that generic language, as it entails reference to kinds of things, 
rather than individuals, represents an interesting nexus among related domains 
of inquiry.  
 Study 1 demonstrated that children are capable of interpreting generics as 
referring to a broad class of entities (i.e., more than “some”), but also permitting 
of exceptions (i.e., less than “all”), at least by 4 years of age. 
Study 2 examined whether stipulating a property of an animal generically 
can modify children’s judgments about category membership.  In particular, in 
Study 2 we found that hearing a generic noun phrase leads children to extend a 
word to another item that shares the predicated property with the target, in 
contrast to another item that is similar to the target in appearance but does not 
share the predicated property.  Study 3 follows up on this finding by providing a 
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more stringent test of the effect of wording.  Specifically, in Study 3, the same-
property choice is pitted against a same-shape choice that is clearly more similar 
to the target.  As noted previously, children are particularly attentive to shape in 
their early categorizations and word extensions (Baldwin, 1992; Landau et al., 
1988; Smith et al., 1996), and some scholars have proposed that young children 
base their word extensions primarily on shape. It is therefore a particularly strong 
test to ask if predicating a property with a generic noun phrase induces children 
to extend a new word in a way that “trumps” shape similarity. 
There are three possible patterns of response that we might plausibly 
expect to find.  First, children may be so focused on object shape that they 
choose the shape-match in both the generic and the non-generic wording 
conditions.  If this pattern were found, it would indicate that although generic 
wording is capable of affecting children’s classifications (as shown in Study 2), it 
is not sufficiently powerful to overcome children’s shape bias.  Second, children 
may be so attentive to the predicated property as expressed in both the generic 
and non-generic wording conditions, that they show an overwhelming tendency 
to select the predicated-property choice in both the generic and non-generic 
wording conditions.  Finally, the third plausible pattern, the one we predict, is that 
generic wording would guide children’s selection of new instances away from the 
same-shape choice and toward the predicated-property choice.  Specifically, this 
suggests that children would select the predicated-property choice after hearing 
a generic statement, and in contrast would select this choice less after hearing a 





Thirty children participated in the experimental condition and 16 in the 
control condition.  Children in the experimental condition ranged in age from 4 
years 3 months to 5 years 11 months, with a mean age of 5 years 1 month; 
children in the control condition ranged from 4 years 4 months to 5 years 11 
months, with a mean age of 5 years 1 month. Additionally, there were a total of 
16 child participants for the pre-testing of materials, ranging in age from 4 years 0 
months to 4 years 11 months, average age 4 years 6 months. Children were 
recruited from university-affiliated preschool centers and from the participant pool 
for a university-based child cognition lab. None of the children had participated in 
the earlier studies. 
Pre-test of Items 
Items from Study 2 were the starting point for creation of a new set of 
items meeting our goal of more directly pitting shape against target properties.  
Therefore each item-set was designed to make the similarity match more clearly 
into a shape-match, and to make the property-match less similar to the target 
(especially with respect to shape).  
 The new item-sets were subjected to a pre-test protocol wherein 
participants judged shape similarity and property presence.  It was reasoned that 
this would clarify a priori whether the shape-choice items captured our intuitions 
about what children would consider to be the same shape as the labeled-item, 
and whether the property-choice items would be clearly seen as sharing the 
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predicated property with the labeled-item.  The items were presented in 2 blocks: 
a shape-question block and a property-question block.  For each trial in the 
shape-question block, the experimenter presented the participant with the target 
picture, and said, for example, “This is a bant”.  The experimenter then placed 
the shape-match and property-match choices side by side beneath the target 
instance and asked, “Which of these has the same shape as the bant?”  The left-
right placement of the shape- and property-match choices was counterbalanced 
across trials for each participant.  The property-question block used the same 
items, but the experimenter said (for example), “This is a bant.  A bant has 
stripes.  Which of these has stripes?” 
The goal here was to ensure that the shape-match instance clearly was 
perceived by children as being of the same shape as the target, and that the 
property-match instance clearly was perceived by children as sharing the same 
predicated property as the target.  
Sixteen children, aged 4 years 0 months to 4 years 11 months (mean age 
4 years 6 months), participated in the pre-test.  The pretesting proceeded in two 
phases.  In each phase, 8 participants rated a set of items.  In order for an item 
to qualify for inclusion in the study proper, at least 6 out of 8 children (75%) 
needed to answer correctly on both the shape and the property questions.  In 
Phase 1, five out of 12 item-sets tested met these requirements; in Phase 2, a 




 The materials for Study 3 were modifications of those used in Study 2, as 
detailed in the pre-test section above.   There were 10 item-sets, each consisting 
of a labeled-instance, a property-match choice, and a shape-match choice.  The 
novel names were kept the same as for Study 2.  Item-sets appear in Appendix 
E. 
Procedure  
 All procedures for Study 3 were the same as for Study 2.   
Predictions for Study 3 
I predicted that Study 3 would replicate the findings of Study 2.  As in 
Study 3, I expected that participants would show a significantly higher rate of 
choosing the property-match on trials in which generic wording was used than on 
those in which non-generic wording was used.  I also expected that the control 
condition, in which only labels and no further information were provided, would 
have a significantly lower rate of property-match responses than both the 
generic-wording and the nongeneric-wording conditions, and be significantly 
lower than would be expected by chance, indicating a baseline tendency to 
choose the shape-match.   
 Results  
As for Study 2, responses were scored as 1 for a property-match choice, 
and as 0 for a shape-match choice.  The scores were summed across the 5-item 
generic wording block, and across the 5-item non-generic wording block for each 
participant, yielding 2 scores between 0 (reflecting all shape-match choices) and 
5 (reflecting all property-match choices) for each participant.  These scores were 
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entered into a 2 (age: adult, child) X 2 (wording: generic, non-generic) X 2 (order: 
generic-first, non-generic first) ANOVA.  As predicted, there was a significant 
main effect of wording, F(1,42) = 64.10, p < .001.  There was also a significant 
Age X Wording interaction, F(1,42) = 35.22, p < .001, and a non-significant three-
way interaction among Age, Wording, and Order (p = .076).  Planned 
comparisons by paired t-tests reveal a significant effect of Wording at each age 
considered separately: for adults, t(15) = 7.14, p < .001, and for children, t(29) = 
1.95, p < .05 (one-tailed).      
Given that we had obtained a significant Age X Order interaction in Study 
2, thereby suggesting that there may be unintended carry-over effects from the 
first to second block of items, we also conducted an analysis of participants’ 
responses to the first block of items only.  In this analysis, both wording and age 
were treated as between-subjects factors.  On a 2 (Age: adult, child) X 2 
(wording: generic, non-generic) ANOVA, there was a significant effect of wording, 
F(1,42) = 34.97, p < .001, and a significant Age X Wording interaction, F(1, 42) = 
7.90, p < .01.  Post-hoc pairwise comparisons confirm that the effect of wording, 
although more pronounced for adults than for children, held for both adults 
(M(generic) = 5.00, M(non-generic) = 1.25,  p < .001) and children (M(generic) = 
3.87, M(non-generic) = 2.53, p < .05).  
Comparisons by t-test to chance levels (50%, or 2.5 out of 5) shows that in 
the generic wording condition, both adults and children chose the predicated-
property match significantly more often than what would be expected by chance 
(M = 4.75 for adults, M = 3.70 for children, ps < .001).  On the non-generic 
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wording trials, however, adults chose the predicated-property significantly less 
often than chance levels (M = 0.94.p < .001), whereas children’s predicated-
property choices were significantly higher than chance (M = 3.13, p < .05).   
 Control.   Analysis of the children tested in the control condition shows that 
property-match responses were given significantly less often than would be 
expected by chance (M = 2.6 out of 10, p < .001).  Indeed, the vast majority of 
the time (nearly 75% of the time), children select the shape-match in the control 
condition.  Thus, as intended, we were successful in designing the item sets such 
that the shape-match was clearly more perceptually similar to the target item, for 
children.   
We also compared responses to the control condition directly (namely, 
comparing each of the two experimental conditions, generic and non-generic to 
the control condition, by means of planned comparison t-tests).  In order to 
compare responses to the control condition (10 items) to responses to the 
experimental conditions (5 items each), we divided responses to the control 
condition by 2, to put all responses on the same scale.  Results indicated that, as 
predicted, children selected the predicated-property choice significantly more 
often in the generic condition than the control condition, t(44) = 6.07, p < .001.  
Surprisingly, children also selected the predicated-property choice significantly 
more often in the non-generic condition than the control condition, t(44) = 4.53, p 
< .02.  Thus, despite the strong pull toward the shape-match when only 
perceptual information is available (i.e., the control condition), children switched 
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to selecting the property-choice match more often in both the generic and non-
generic conditions. 
Item analyses 
 As in Study 2, to ensure that there weren’t any systematic differences 
attributable to variability in the items, the rate of predicated-property match 
responding was calculated for each of the 10 items.  Analysis of the child 
responses indicated that 7 of the 10 items showed the expected response 
pattern, with a higher percentage of predicated-property match choices for the 
generic wording condition than for the non-generic condition.  Considering the 
first-block responses only, 8 of the 10 items showed the expected pattern.  For 
adults, all of the 10 items showed higher property-match responding on the 
generic wording trials. 
 
Discussion 
 The current study replicates and extends Study 2.  As in Study 2, in Study 
3 I asked whether children and adults are sensitive to the subtle distinctions in 
the language (generic vs. non-generic) when providing property-relevant 
information.  Specifically, I examined whether providing property-highlighting 
information about a novel animal, after first providing a novel label for it, would 
influence children’s naming extensions.  Study 2 provided evidence that both 
children and adults were sensitive to the differences between generic and non-
generic wording, although adults showed greater sensitivity than did children.  
The current study replicates this finding:  both children and adults were more 
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likely to extend the novel label to an item with the predicated property, when the 
property was expressed with generic vs. non-generic wording.   
Another feature of Study 3 that is worth noting is that we employed an 
improved set of items, in which the baseline preference (in the absence of stated 
property information) was to select the same-shape match.  This preference was 
confirmed both in pretesting with children, and in the control condition. Materials 
developed in this way appear to have overcome the problems of the stimuli-set 
from Study 2, in that children were now significantly more likely to chose the 
shape-match, as expected.  Importantly, this means that when children did select 
the predicated-property choice, this was particularly impressive, as it entailed not 
choosing a same-shape choice that was strongly preferred a priori. 
 One surprising result from Study 3 was that the non-generic wording 
condition also led to higher selection of the predicated-property response than in 
the control condition.  Although such responses are lower in the non-generic than 
the generic wording condition, it is nonetheless noteworthy that the non-generic 
wording condition yielded such high levels of performance.  In some respects this 
may not be an altogether unexpected result, in that both experimental conditions 
verbally state (and therefore emphasize) the predicated property.  Nonetheless, 
there may be a developmental change in the non-generic wording condition.  We 
would expect adults to interpret the non-generic statements as implying lack of 
generality.  For example, “This bant has stripes” should indicate that the property 
of stripedness is likely to be idiosyncratic and particular to this individual bant.  In 
contrast, children seem not to understand that the non-generic statement implies 
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less generality than a neutral control condition.  Perhaps this is a pragmatic 
implication that is too subtle for preschool-aged children.  In the future, it would 
be intriguing to examine interpretation of this linguistic form more directly, from a 
developmental perspective. 
In any case, one very interesting potential suggestion that emerges from 
this finding is that (as was also found in Study 1), developmental change may 
take place more in how children interpret non-generics than in how children 
interpret generics.  Although speculative, this result may again suggest the 
possibility that generics are readily interpreted by young children, perhaps even 
as a default, and that it is non-generics that are more complicated and require 



















 Generic language is a topic of increasing interest to researchers in diverse 
fields (Gelman, 2003, 2004; Leslie, 2005; Prasada, 2006; Prasada et al., in 
press).  As it stands at the intersection of core concerns for linguists, 
philosophers, cognitive scientists, and developmental psychologists, there is the 
potential for the kind of cross-fertilization of ideas that leads to novel approaches 
and increased insight into processes of interest to all.  I aimed in the studies 
presented in this dissertation to advance our understanding of how generic 
language is comprehended, in tasks that touch on broad theoretical issues but 
which are grounded firmly in research in early cognitive development.   
 In this concluding chapter, I will summarize the findings of the three 
dissertation studies, and discuss in turn how the present results speak to the 
puzzle of generic language (including treatments of generics in linguistics), as 
well as the puzzle of generic knowledge.  I will also address the limitations of the 




Summary and Overview of Main Findings 
 
The current studies provide strong evidence that children appropriately 
distinguish generic forms from non-generic ones.  In that regard, they stand with 
several recent studies (Gelman & Raman, 2003; Gelman & Bloom, in press), part 
of a new and growing body of research that addresses the crucial question 
theorists (Gelman, 2004; Leslie, 2005) are beginning to ask about generic 
language:  how do children acquire a form that poses such a difficult problem of 
induction? In the present studies specifically, I compare children’s and adults’ 
comprehension of generic language to other importantly related forms, and 
thereby aim to address this acquisition dilemma. 
In Study 1, I found that adults and 4-year-old children appropriately 
distinguish generic language from overt quantifiers (“all”, “some”) that are 
importantly related to generics in their implied scope.   Four-year-olds and adults 
do not treat generics as equivalent to the universal quantifier ‘all’ in their replies 
to yes/no questions about properties of varying scope; thus, generics do not 
imply universal scope. Nor do children treat generics as equivalent to the 
indefinite set-theoretic term ‘some’.  The pattern of responses and of justifications 
for adults and 4-year-olds in Study 1 can be taken as indication that generic noun 
phrases are appreciated as kind-referring, and, importantly, not confounded with 
the set-theoretic terms ‘all’ and ‘some’.  
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These findings are echoed in the results of an elicited production task 
reported along with Study 1 in Hollander et al. (2002).  Study 2 of that paper 
found that children distinguished appropriately the implied scope of ‘all’, ‘some’ 
and generic phrasings when listing properties of familiar kinds.  It would be 
interesting to conduct further work in this vein, to establish the course of 
development of abilities to distinguish generic expressions from other related 
forms, to get a fuller picture of the semantic landscape in this regard.  Work such 
as the analysis of the spontaneous speech archived in the CHILDES database 
(MacWhinney & Snow, 1990) done by Gelman et al. (in press) provides  
persuasive evidence that even very young children (their database included 
children as young as 2 years) can use multiple forms to express generics.   
Study 1 not only provides an interesting demonstration that by 4 years old 
children appreciate the distinctive semantic aspect of generics which makes 
them so hard for linguists to explain—broad scope but admitting of exceptions—
but also suggests development in this regard.  Three-year-old participants did not 
distinguish generic, “all”, and “some”, but rather seemed to treat all three forms 
(generic, “all”, and “some”) as generic.  The data from the 3-year-olds looked 
very much like the response patterns from the older participants in the generic-
wording conditions. In other words, the generic interpretation appeared to be 
relatively straightforward and transparent for the youngest participants, despite 
claims in the literature that generics should be difficult to acquire according to the 
traditional quantificational account of genericity.  Simply put, generics seemed 
easier to learn and use than set-theoretic quantifier terms!   
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Nor is it the case that the quantifiers “all” and “some” were simply 
unfamiliar to the youngest children, as even 3-year-olds had little difficulty 
interpreting them appropriately when they were applied to concrete sets used in 
the post-test (e.g., indicating that when 3 out of 4 crayons are in the box, “some” 
are in the box, but not “all”).  It was only when we asked children to apply these 
quantifiers abstractly to familiar categories that their interpretations fell apart.   
The finding that 3-year-olds seemed to treat both quantified and generic 
expressions as generic, has implications for models of learning, which I will 
return to in a later section (“The puzzle of generic language”). 
 Studies 2 and 3 indicated that 4- to 5-year-old children and adults 
distinguished between generic and non-generic sentences in guiding their 
extension of novel labels for animals.  As far as I know this is the first 
demonstration of the effect of generic language on word extension. Although 
there has been research into how specific and generic language are used in 
different contexts (e.g,, Goldin-Meadow, et al., 2005; Gelman, Chesnick, & 
Waxman, 2005; Gelman & Pappas, 1998; Gelman & Tardif, 1998), and studies 
showing how adults and children differentiate generics from quantifier terms such 
as ‘all’ and ‘some’ in induction tasks (Gelman et al., 2002), such studies focused 
on children’s comprehension of familiar generics for familiar categories.  The 
present Studies 2 and 3 were notable for examining how preschool children 
interpret generics for novel categories, and make use of generic expressions in 
the service of word learning.  
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 Studies 2 and 3 indicate that children can make use of generic language 
in decisions about the extension of a novel word.  Thus, these studies place 
generic language among the kinds of linguistic information that children can 
attend to in determining the referent of a novel term.  Many studies have 
indicated, for instance, that preschool-aged children can use formal cues when 
interpreting novel words (Brown, 1958; Macnamara, 1982; Hall et al., 1993; Hall, 
2004; see Bloom, 2000, for review).  For example, children interpret mass nouns 
as referring to substances, verbs as referring to actions, proper names as 
referring to individuals, etc.  One notable difference between this work and the 
prior demonstrations, however, is the subtlety of the semantics underlying the 
generic-nongeneric distinction.  Whereas the semantic distinction in prior work 
tended to have some sort of material correlate  (e.g., substances are materially 
different from individuated objects, at least when one considers the sets to which 
they refer), there is no such distinction between a set of individuals and a kind, 
other than an abstract conceptual difference.  Nonetheless, children attend to this 
distinction by 4 to 5 years of age.   
As in Study 1, however, there is clearly some development occurring. 
Although the effect of generic wording holds in both Studies 2 and 3, for both 
adults and children, the effect is notably greater for adults.  That is, adults 
seemed to be more sensitive to the distinct semantics of generic versus non-
generic phrasing for predicating properties of the novel animals presented to 
them.  The differences came in children’s responding to the non-generic 
language trials, more than in response to the generic language trials (as 
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compared to the control label-only condition).   Once again, this raises the 
intriguing possibility that children understand generic language, but have more 
trouble interpreting the specific expressions.  
One clear way to interpret the specific, non-generic wording in Studies 2 
and 3—“This bant has stripes”—is in a contrastive sense.  The utterance implies 
that this particular bant (only) has the property of stripedness, and that the 
property is not kind-relevant.  This indeed was how adults seemed to interpret 
this wording.  Although adults were no higher than chance in Study 2, they 
extended the labeled property significantly below chance in Study 3 (where the 
materials were preselected to provide an especially clear and compelling shape 
alternative). In both studies, adults chose the same-property match upwards of 
90% of the time on generic-wording trials.  Thus, adults appeared to be sensitive 
to the pragmatic issues related to the non-generic wording.   
It was surprising, then, that children chose the same-property match at 
levels higher than chance on the non-generic wording trials, in both studies.  This 
result again implies that what changes developmentally is not the interpretation 
of generic language, but rather the interpretation of non-generic language. 
Another finding of interest in Studies 2 and 3 was that order of 
presentation seemed to affect children’s (but not adults’) responses. In both 
studies, the non-generic first order resulted in a greater distinction between the 
property-match scores for the generic wording and the non-generic wording.  
Another way of thinking about this, is that children seem to have been affected by 
carryover from the generic-wording block, but not from the non-generic block, 
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suggesting that once they hear and interpret the generically stated connections 
between having a property (say, having 2 humps), and being a member of a 
novel category (say, being a ‘dorn’), they have greater difficulty in interpreting 
appropriately the non-generic statements of the following block.   
Despite these differences in performance between adults and children, 
Studies 2 and 3 show that preschool-aged children do distinguish generic from 
specific language as sources of information about how to extend a novel label, 
and therefore adds to the growing body of evidence about children’s abilities to 
analyze and understand generic utterances.  Gelman and Raman (2003) likewise 
show that children as young as 2-1/2 years old can appropriately read generic 
and specific meaning in sentences that vary only slightly (e.g., “What color are 
dogs?” versus “What color are the dogs?”).  They find that formal cues like the 
presence (versus absence) of the determiner “the” can be used by children as 
young as 2-1/2 years of age, and that children as young as 3 years can exploit 
pragmatic cues relevant to the resolution of anaphoric reference. The current 
studies similarly suggest that children comprehend the bare plural noun phrase in 
the generic-wording trials as establishing a generic-meaning—i.e., that it implies 
the predicated property is relatively central to category identity.  This is just what 
we would want to have demonstrated if we want to theorize about a possible role 
for generic language in the acquisition of generic knowledge, a point to which I 
will return. 
 
The Puzzle of Generic Language 
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 Generic language poses a puzzle in two distinct yet related ways.  First, 
and most directly for our purposes, it poses a puzzle to young children as they 
attempt to figure out the devices available in English for expressing generics.  As 
noted earlier, although all of language development poses such a problem of 
induction, the issue is particularly severe in the case of generics, because the 
referents are not directly available in the environment, and the formal means of 
expression are varied and lack one-to-one correspondence with meaning.  For 
example, bare plural noun phrases are used both for generics (“Tigers are 
striped”) and indefinite expressions (“Tigers escaped from the zoo”).   
The second puzzle posed by generic language concerns linguistic theory. 
Although generic language has been a topic of debate among linguists and 
philosophers for some time, there has been a recent spate of challenges to the 
traditionally accepted accounts (Leslie, 2005; Prasada, in press; Prasada & 
Dillingham, 2006).  Indeed, as I touch on in Chapter 1, genericity as a 
phenomenon has been problematic for ‘precise semantic frameworks’ (Krifka et 
al., 1995), in particular because generic sentences are deemed generally true 
while admitting of exceptions.  
 Krifka et al. (1995) describe the dominant approach, in which genericity is 
treated within the confines of a traditional linguistic treatment of extension and 
quantification, and with the formalism based on considerations of English in 
particular.  Heim (1982) extends Lewis’s work (1975) on adverbial quantification 
to account for generics, proposing that a sentence such as “Tigers have stripes” 
be thought of as a special case of adverbial quantification, with an operator 
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analogous to other quantifier terms.  This unarticulated operator—“Gen”—comes 
to bear just in case there are unbound variables and no explicit adverbs of 
quantification.  Thus, it can be thought of as a sort of null operator, represented 
logically as a variant on the workings of other quantificational adverbs, such as 
“mostly” or “usually”.  But consideration of words such as “generally,” ”typically,” 
and “usually” shows that although they might be acceptable glosses for some 
generic sentences (e.g., “Tigers typically have stripes”), they do not work very 
well for others.  For example, “Ticks carry Lyme Disease” seems true, whereas 
“Usually, ticks carry Lyme Disease” does not (Leslie, 2005). 
Leslie reviews alternate analyses of generic expressions, and finds them 
lacking (Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Cohen, 1996; Pelletier & 
Asher, 1997).  She considers in turn proposals wherein generics are counted as 
a restricted universal quantifier meaning something like “all normal” (Asher & 
Morreau, 1995), analyses which add domain restrictions to such ‘modal’ 
accounts (Pelletier & Asher, 1997), and theories that do not entail a modal 
treatment of generics but that do depend on domain restrictions and partitioning 
(Cohen, 1996).  Although she credits some frameworks with greater success 
than others, she argues that none can properly account for what she terms 
“troublesome generics”, e.g. “Mosquitoes carry West Nile virus.”   
Leslie argues for a re-consideration of existing approaches to capturing 
the linguistic and truth-value attributes of generic sentences, and suggests that 
evidence about how generics are produced and comprehended in the course of 
development might be critically important to that enterprise.  In that vein, if we 
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accept the characterization of the generic as a null operator, coming to bear only 
in the absence of articulated quantifiers, it would seem a particularly difficult form 
to acquire.  How might a child come to understand a form whose semantics keep 
linguists and philosophers busy and which has no phonological correlate to boot?   
 
The data from the current experiments speak to both inductive problems.  
First, that generics are readily interpreted at preschool age suggests that the 
learning problem is such that children have no difficulty accessing generic 
concepts during language acquisition.  It does not seem to be the case, for 
example, that children are limited to concrete reference in the preschool years, 
as suggested by some scholars (Sloutsky, Kloos & Fisher, 2007).   
Second, the patterns of results suggest that generics may in fact be a 
default interpretation for young children.  Recall that in Study 1, 3-year-olds’ 
responses showed significant differences as a function of the property type (e.g., 
“fires are hot” was treated as broader in scope than “flowers are yellow”), but not 
as a function of the noun-phrase wording condition (e.g., “all flowers are yellow”, 
“some flowers are yellow”, and “flowers are yellow” were all treated as 
equivalent).  I argue that these findings are problematic for any semantic analysis 
of generics as a special case of quantifier term requiring some kind of calculation 
or mental summary over tokens to get at meaning from a generic sentence.      
Similarly, in Studies 2 and 3, the developmental changes between children 
and adults appeared to be in the interpretation of non-generic utterances rather 
than in the interpretation of generic utterances.  Again this suggests that generics 
 
 89
are rather straightforward and transparent to acquire, in distinction from non-
generics.  Similarly, Gelman et al. (in press) provides evidence that from 
children’s initial uses of generics (at about age 2-1/2 years), they use multiple 
forms to express them (including bare plural, indefinite singular, and mass 
nouns).  They argue that it would be exceedingly difficult for children to learn how 
to express generics as they do by some process of mapping the multiple 
language forms onto generic concepts, and suggest instead that generics count 
as the default interpretation for noun phrases.  In acquisition, then, children must 
learn the various ways that specific reference is expressed. 
 
The Puzzle of Generic Knowledge 
I outlined in Chapter 1 how generic language presents not only an 
inductive puzzle to the child learning to produce reference to kinds but also 
relates to the question of learning about kinds of things at all (Gelman, 2003, 
2004; Prasada, 2000).  We can never see a kind, only instances thereof, and yet 
we speak of kinds via generic expressions, and do so from a young age (Gelman 
et al., in press; Gelman & Tardif, 1998; Goldin-Meadow et al. 2005).  The current 
studies can be seen as speaking to these concerns about the development and 
accessing of knowledge about kinds of things, in commonsense conception.  
In Study 1 we assessed generic knowledge, knowledge our participants 
had about familiar kinds of things:  fires and elephants and frogs and girls and 
garages and milk.  It can be argued that the pattern of participants’ replies tells 
us something about how they access and reason about kinds.  Four-year-olds 
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are very much like adults in this regard. They can access their real-world 
knowledge about dogs in response to queries made with set-theoretic quantifiers 
and with generics, and interpret appropriately  the scope of the question, as it 
combines with the scope of the property relative to the category of which it is 
predicated. As noted earlier, 3–year-olds succeed only when the wording is 
generic.  This intriguing finding can be taken as relevant to categories 
themselves perhaps, to the way in which we think of concepts. One interesting 
difference between Study 1 and the traditional truth-value judgment task, 
sometimes conducted as thought exercise and sometimes systematically 
evaluated (Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), is that I made use of questions rather 
than declarative sentences.  It is interesting to speculate that sentences such as 
“Girls have curly hair” might be judged as ‘false’, whereas the sentence “Do girls 
have curly hair?” was often endorsed with a ‘yes’, albeit possibly with an 
accompanying qualification.    
Most relevant to the question of generic knowledge are Studies 2 and 3, 
where we manipulated the information provided to children about kinds, using 
generic or nongeneric language.  As we found, generic wording increases 
children’s tendency to link a property to a kind.  This result shows that the 
generic-nongeneric distinction has important conceptual implications as children 
build knowledge and theories about the world.  It is also interesting that even with 
non-generic wording, hearing a property linked to an individual increases 
children’s tendency to link the property to the corresponding kind.  Thus, once 
again this suggests that preschoolers have no difficulty accessing generic 
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knowledge.  This tendency to generalize from a specific example to the kind is all 
the more remarkable when we consider that the kinds under study here are not 
familiar kinds about which children have a rich a priori knowledge base of 
existing generalizations.  Rather, these were wholly novel kinds, indicated only 
by an individual picture and an individual property. 
Importantly, Studies 2 and 3 constitute a demonstration that generic 
language can be used in the service of word learning.  In this way, linking a 
property to a category via generic language can be seen as similar to other 
linguistic manipulations shown to affect the constitution of a kind, like labeling 
does (Waxman, 2004; Waxman & Markow, 1995).  Insofar as extending words to 
new instances can reveal something about how a kind is conceptualized, Studies 
2 and 3 also indicate that generic language can serve to stipulate kind-relevant 
properties.  Importantly, generically phrased property predication was shown to 
‘trump’ the cue to kind-status typically evidenced by shared shape (Bloom, 2000; 
Smith et al., 2006). Thus, adults and children in these studies seemed to 
appreciate that generics are importantly kind-referring, and they imply that the 
predicated properties are not ‘merely’ true of an individual, that the semantics 
speak to types, rather than tokens. This is just the sort of result one would need 
to show if generic stipulation were to play a role in the acquisition of 
commonsense knowledge (Prasada, 2000; Prasada, in press).   
Of course one issue that demands further investigation is whether kinds 
are equivalent in their accessibility to young children.  Studies 2 and 3 included 
only animals, and it may be that certain categories are more likely to foster the 
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sort of extension-from-the-individual-instance as we have seen here (with 
animals being a particularly good example).  In this regard, we must consider the 
potential importance of content domains (e.g., living kinds, social kinds, artifacts) 
to determining what counts as a kind, expressible via generic language.  
Characterizing knowledge as being organized into domains has been a fruitful 
approach to questions about the nature of early concepts and their development 
(Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999; Wellman & Gelman, 1998).  Insofar as the current 
studies are concerned with the connections between properties and categories, 
we can consider the important issue of what sorts of properties can be thought of 
as relatively ‘essential’ to kind-identity.   
Relatedly, another important issue concerns property type.  Although we 
included both physical attributes (“Do elephants have trunks?”) and actions (“Do 
animals eat?”) in Study 1, most of the questions were about parts or attributes 
rather than behaviors.  It would have been interesting to be able to compare 
these, especially as broken down by category type, particularly because the 
elicited production task also reported in Hollander et al. (2002) shows interesting 
distinctions. In the content analysis for that task, actions appeared relatively more 
often in response to generic language questions and physical properties 
appeared relatively less often in response to generic prompts. 
Limitations and Further Directions 
 As with any investigation, this research leaves certain issues unresolved 
and raises questions for the future.  I mention some of the more central issues in 
this final section. 
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The above consideration of domains of thought brings up one important 
limitation of the current study:  the current studies did not permit an analysis of 
responses as a function of category (e.g., animals, artifacts).  Specifically, 
although Study 1 included items from a range of domains, domains were not 
systematically varied within conditions.  Furthermore, I included only animals as 
stimulus categories in Studies 2 and 3.  Therefore, the studies do not permit an 
analysis of responses by domain.   
The extent to which this limits the conclusions from the current studies is 
unclear.  One possibility is that domain may yield no effects on these results.  For 
one thing, there are no semantic restrictions on which domains can be expressed 
with generics, so that generics are readily expressible for both animals and 
artifact categories, for example (“Tigers have stripes”; “Pencils are skinny”).  
Furthermore, Prasada and Dillingham (2006) found no differences between 
animals and artifacts in their studies of adults’ interpretation of generic 
sentences.   
Nonetheless, there is also reason to believe that domain may play an 
important role in the development or expression of generic language.  As 
repeatedly noted, generics express kind concepts, and there is a vast literature 
suggesting that kind concepts differ as a function of domain (Hirschfeld & 
Gelman, 1994; Keil, 1991; Wellman & Gelman, 1998).  Indeed, we chose animal 
categories in these studies precisely because prior research indicated that 
generic language is used more often in talk about animals (Gelman et al., 1998; 
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Gelman et al., in press) and we wanted to examine generic language in a domain 
to which it seems most naturally connected.   
Two issues are relevant to the limitations imposed by this choice.  First, 
the use of animals may have reduced the sensitivity of our test, insofar as we 
were gauging children’s willingness to move their label extensions away from a 
shape choice.  There is reason to believe that the processes inherent to 
determining category status for animals are more complex than they are for 
artifact kinds (Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1998; Booth & Waxman, 2006).  Second, 
the question of how generic language relates to generic knowledge could have 
been addressed in ways relevant to important open questions if we had been 
able to compare animal and artifact kinds.  Would generic language have the 
same effect on word extensions for novel animals and novel artifacts?  Would 
children’s grasp of the pragmatics of the situation been different if we hadn’t 
given them the potentially more complex task of judging the category 
membership of animals?    
A further limitation of the current work concerns the nature of the 
predicates used in all three studies.  As touched on earlier, we did not 
systematically vary the content of the properties that were included.  In Study 1, 
the properties ranged broadly, including behaviors, perceptual properties, parts, 
functions, etc.  In Studies 2 and 3, all the properties were perceptual (as required 
by the task design).  Certainly there is reason to believe that children already 
have a priori beliefs concerning the centrality of particular features (or feature 
types) to the kinds under investigation (Keil, 1994).  For example, color is more 
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central to foods, whereas shape is more central to artifacts (Macario, Shipley, & 
Billman,1990).  Moreover, property centrality may interact in interesting ways with 
language form (generic vs. specific).  For example, Study 2 in Hollander et al. 
(2002) found that actions were more likely to be mentioned in response to 
generically worded queries and that physical attributes were relatively less likely 
to be mentioned in reply to generic queries.  This is intriguing given previous 
findings that behavior—rather than external properties—may be more important 
to determining what something is (Shipley, 2000; Gelman & Wellman, 1991).  
Thus, it would be interesting in future work to vary systematically the nature of 
the property queried (as in Study 1) or taught (as in Studies 2 and 3), to 
determine whether children are more likely to accept certain types of properties 
than others in generic vs. specific wording conditions.  Such results could provide 
indirect insight into the nature of young children’s conceptual representations. 
A final limitation concerning the properties and categories employed in 
these studies is that we did not predetermine how familiar both the categories 
(e.g., fires, girls) and the properties (e.g., “are hot”, “have curly hair”) would be to 
our youngest participants in particular.  Perhaps three-year-olds’ 
misunderstanding of the quantifier terms we examine would be affected by how 
familiar they were with the categories and properties presented. However, we do 
not believe that this is a serious problem, because (as noted earlier), 3-year-olds 
in Study 1 were in fact highly sensitive to the scope of the properties provided 
(judging “fires are hot” as more generalizable than  “girls have curly hair”, for 
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example), thereby demonstrating that they were sufficiently familiar with these 
category-property pairings, for the purposes of this task. 
I end with one further, very speculative point about the relationship 
between generic knowledge and generic language.  Although models of how the 
two are connected vis-a-vis conceptual structure and knowledge organization are 
being developed (Prasada, in press; Prasada, Salajegheh, Bowles, & Poeppel, in 
press), and it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to address them, I am 
mindful that questions about domains of knowledge, the ways in which individual 
kind concepts are initially acquired, fleshed out, and accessed, and how 
language affects and is affected by knowledge about kinds of things can be  
productively examined through the lens of studying generics.  
In sum, the current studies indicate that generic language is understood to 
be genuinely kind-referring by preschool-aged children, and that generic 
language is understood to link property to category in kind-relevant ways.  The 
current work therefore sets forward as procedurally valid, as it were, all sorts of 
further explorations into relevant kind-related knowledge acquisition processes.   
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 Figure 2.1 Study 1 Results: Mean number of “yes” responses (out of 4 
possible). 
Top: results for 3-year-olds (N = 18). These scores were doubled to be on the 
same scale as those of the 4-year-olds and adults. Middle: results for 
4-year-olds (N = 18). Bottom: results for adults (N = 38). 
 
 (A) 3-year-olds (N=18).  Note:  These scores were doubled to be on the same scale as 
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Figure 2.2   Reanalysis of Study 1 results, including only the first block of trials.  
Dependent measure is the mean # “yes” responses, out of 4 possible. 
 
(A) 3-year-olds (N=18).  Note:  These scores were doubled to be on the same 







































Table 2.1   Study 1, mean number of qualifications using “some” or “all” (out of 12 
possible). 
 
            3 years [a]          4 years                     Adults 
“Some” qualifications 
 “All” questions   1.11   0.83   0.11 
 Generic questions  0.78   1.56   1.71 
     n.s.     +     ** 
 
“All” qualifications 
 “Some” questions  0.00   1.61   0.37 
 Generic questions  0.00   0.33   0.00 
     n.s.     **     * 
 
[a] These scores were doubled to be on the same scale as those of the 4-year-
olds and adults. 
+ significant difference between question type, p < .05, one-tailed 
* significant difference between question type, p < .05 













Table 2.2 Study 1, individual response patterns.  Scores indicate the 
percentage of participants in each age group adhering to one of three response 
patterns or falling within no consistent response pattern (other).  The numbers of 
participants are provided in parentheses. 
 
    3 years  4 years  Adults 
Generic = intermediate   6% (1)  56% (10)  68% (26)  
Generic = some  17% (3)  17% (3)  24% (9) 
Generic = all   11% (2)    6% (1)    8% (3) 





Table 3.1  Study 2, Mean number of trials (out of 6) on which the predicated-
property choice is selected, as a function of age group. 
 
 
   Generic  Non-Generic Control 
Adults 
      Overall Mean 
        Generic First 
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* = significantly greater than chance (3.0), p < .05 












Table 4.1  Study 3, Mean number of trials (out of 5) on which the predicated-
property choice is selected, as a function of age group. 
 
 
   Generic  Non-Generic Control 
Adults 
      Overall Mean 
        Generic First 















        Generic First 















* = significantly greater than chance (2.5), p < .05 
** = significantly greater than chance (2.5), p < .001 









Appendix A Study 1 items (listed here in generic form only).  All items were 




* Do animals eat? 
* Do elephants have trunks? 
* Are fires hot?    
* Do frogs have eyes? 
* Do ice creams melt in the sun? 
* Do refrigerators have doors? 
Do alligators have mouths? 
Is candy sweet?   
Do cars have engines? 
Do giraffes have long necks? 
Do hammers have handles? 
Do plants grow? 
 
Narrow-scope questions  
* Do bears have white fur? 
* Do books have color pictures?   
* Do clothes have zippers? 
* Do dogs have brown spots?   
* Do girls have curly hair? 
 * Do shirts have stripes? 
 Do birds live in cages? 
 Do dresses have pockets? 
 Are flowers yellow? 
 Does milk have chocolate in it? 
 Do people have blonde hair? 
 Are tools made of wood? 
 
Irrelevant questions: 
 * Are children made of feathers? 
 * Do fish have branches? 
 * Do fruits have gas tanks? 
 * Do garages sing? 
 * Do magazines blow bubbles? 
 * Do monkeys have beaks? 
 Do couches have windows? 
 Do pencils have noses? 
Do penguins have telephones? 
Do pigs fly? 
Do saws have toothaches? 




Appendix B  Study 2 Items.  Trials shown as divided into A- and B- groups and 





1.  This is a TEPIN.  Let me tell you something about this tepin. This tepin has 
whiskers.   
  
2.  This is a FEBBIT.  Let me tell you something about this febbit. This febbit is 
spiky.   
 
3.  This is a BLEEN.  Let me tell you something about this bleen. This bleen has 
a long neck.   
  
4. This is a BANT.  Let me tell you something about this bant. This bant has 
stripes.   
 
5.  This is a DORN.  Let me tell you something about this dorn. This dorn has two 
humps. 
 
6.  This is a VORZYD.  Let me tell you something about this vorzyd.  This vorzyd 
is red. 
 
   
B-group 
 
1.  This is a FEP.  Let me tell you something about feps.  Feps are spotted. 
 
 
2.  This is a PLOG.  Let me tell you something about plogs.  Plogs are green. 
 
 




4.  This is a YANCI.  Let me tell you something about yancis.  Yancis have a 
crest. 
 
5.  This is a SCRED.  Let me tell you something about screds.  Screds have a 
long tail. 
 
 6.  This is a KEVTA.  Let me tell you something about kevtas.  Kevtas are wooly.
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Appendix C Study 3 Items.  Trials shown as divided into A- and B- groups and 





1.  This is a TEPIN.  Let me tell you something about this tepin. This tepin has 
big ears.   
  
2.  This is a FEBBIT.  Let me tell you something about this febbit. This febbit is 
spiky.   
  
3. This is a BANT.  Let me tell you something about this bant. This bant has 
stripes.   
 
4.  This is a DORN.  Let me tell you something about this dorn. This dorn has 
long hair. 
 
5.  This is a VORZYD.  Let me tell you something about this vorzyd.  This vorzyd 
is red. 
 
   
B-group 
 
1.  This is a FEP.  Let me tell you something about feps.  Feps are spotted. 
 
 
2.  This is a PLOG.  Let me tell you something about plogs.  Plogs are green. 
 
 
3.  This is a YANCI.  Let me tell you something about yancis.  Yancis have stars. 
 
 
4.  This is a BACTRA.  Let me tell you something about bactras.  Bactras have 
three legs. 
 






Appendix D  Study 2 Item Sets, Group A 
 Bant Bleen 














Appendix D  Study 2 Item Sets, Group A, Continued 
 Dorn Febbit 
   
Labeled 
   
Property 




Appendix D  Study 2 Item Sets, Group A, Continued 
 Tepin Vorzyd 
   
Labeled 
   
Property 




Appendix D  Study 2 Item Sets, Group B 
 Bactra Fep 















Appendix D  Study 2 Item Sets, Group B, Continued 
 Kevta Plog 
   
Labeled 
   
Property 




Appendix D  Study 2 Item Sets, Group B, Continued 
 Scred Yanci 
   
Labeled 
  
   
Property 
  





Appendix E  Study 3 Item Sets 
 Bactra Dorn 
   
Labeled 
 
   
Property 
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